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TORTS
I.

THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS ACT

Introduction
New Mexico government entities have been vested with common law
sovereign immunity since the state's inception in 1912.' In 1975, however,
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hicks v. State' abolished common
law sovereign immunity for New Mexico government entities in tort
actions, leaving those entities subject to lawsuits for the negligence of
their employees. 3 The legislature responded in the next legislative session
by passing the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 4 which statutorily immunizes
the state from all tort actions except those excluded by the Act.
During this survey period, the New Mexico appellate courts considered
the constitutionality of the Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations.
Additionally, the appellate courts considered when immunity is waived
for government entities which supervise law enforcement officers. Finally,
the supreme court ruled on the State Highway Department's duty to
supervise the maintenance of non-state roads.

A.

B.

Statute of Limitations

1. The Constitutionality of the "No Tolling" Provision of the
Tort Claims Act
In 1986, Lawrence Jaramillo was severely injured in a one-car accident
on a state road.' Almost three years after the accident occurred, Rosita
Jaramillo, as Lawrence's guardian, filed suit against the State, the New
Mexico State Highway Department, the Rio Arriba Board of County
Commissioners, and the Rio Arriba Road Department, alleging that
negligent maintenance of State Road 389 caused Lawrence's accident and
the damages he suffered. Defendants moved to dismiss the claim, asserting
that it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations imposed by the
1975 Tort Claims Act. 6
Mrs. Jaramillo filed an affidavit claiming that the statute of limitations
violated Lawrence's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
because Lawrence was mentally incapable of filing suit within the proscribed time limit. The trial court held that the statute of limitations

1. See Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REv.
249 (1976).
2. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).

3. Id.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
5. Jaramillo v. State, III N.M. 722, 723, 809 P.2d 636, 637. cert. denied, III N.M. 416, 806
P.2d 65 (1991).
6. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15.
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was constitutional and dismissed Mrs. Jaramillo's complaint. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding and dismissed
7
Jaramillo's complaint with prejudice.
Under section 41-4-15(A) of the Tort Claims Act, persons who are
rendered incompetent by government entities and are over the age of
seven have two years to file suit regardless of their legal disabilities.,
The statute of limitations for actions against a government entity represents
a departure from statutes of limitations for private tortfeasors. 9 In most
instances, the statute of limitations for private tortfeasors is three years.' 0
The limitation on filing an action under the New Mexico Tort Claims
Act, however, expires at the end of two years, regardless of existing
circumstances."
Mrs. Jaramillo claimed that the statute of limitations, because it did
not toll during the period of her son's incompetence, violated his equal
protection and due process rights as guaranteed by the New Mexico and
United States Constitutions. 2 According to Mrs. Jaramillo, her son was
denied his constitutional right of access to the courts guaranteed by the
United States and New Mexico Constitutions. 3
2.

Equal Protection Claim

a. Standard of Review
Before determining whether Lawrence Jaramillo's equal protection rights
were violated, the court discussed the appropriate standard of review for
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute of limitations. '4 Mrs.
Jaramillo asserted that two recent New Mexico decisions mandated that
the court of appeals use the heightened scrutiny test to determine whether
the statute of limitations violated Lawrence Jaramillo's constitutional
rights. 5 In both Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque 6 and Richardson v.
Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc.'7 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that intermediate scrutiny must be applied to cases in which the limitations
on the amount of damages recoverable against particular defendants are
challenged." Mrs. Jaramillo claimed that heightened scrutiny was implicated because mental incapacitation was a sensitive class and because her

7. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. at 724, 809 P.2d at 638.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A).
9. See N.M. Medical Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1989), which
provides for a statute of limitations of three years.
10. Id.
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15.
12. Jaramillo, Ill N.M. at 724, 809 P.2d at 638.
13. Id.; see U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
14. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. at 724-25, 809 P.2d at 638-39.
15. Id.
16. 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990).
17. 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
18. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 623, 798 P.2d at 573; Richardson, 107 N.M. at 698, 763 P.2d at
1163.

Summer 1992]

TORTS

interest was an important one.' 9 She further argued that a strict interpretation of the statute of limitations deprives a class of persons of their
right to compensation based on their mental incompetence, making an
analogy between the statute of limitations and the limitations on the
amount of damages challenged in Richardson and Trujillo.20
The defendants contended that equal protection challenges to statutes
of limitations are traditionally analyzed under the rational basis test in
New Mexico. Thus, the defendants maintained that the statute of limi21
tations of the Tort Claims Act should also be subject to that test.
In determining which test should be employed, the court found both
Richardson and Trujillo to be factually and legally distinguishable from
the case at hand. 22 In Richardson, the New Mexico Supreme Court
identified the constitutional right of full recovery in tort as a "substantial
and important individual interest. ' ' 23 This right to full recovery in tort
stems from the constitutional right of access to the courts.2 The supreme
court held that the constitutionality of these types of interests should be
analyzed under heightened scrutiny. 25 In Trujillo, the court merely confirmed the propriety of using intermediate scrutiny in challenges to limitations on the amount of damages recoverable against particular classes
26
of defendants.
Factually, both cases address the limitation on the amount of recovery
available, as opposed to the time limitation for bringing suit. 27 Legally,
both cases implicate a right of access to the courts in addition to a
constitutionally protected right of full recovery in tort. 28 The reasoning
of the court of appeals suggested that Lawrence Jaramillo's mental
incapacity, as it related to the Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations,
did not implicate a substantial and important individual interest triggering
heightened scrutiny as it merely involved the more general right of equal

access to the courts. 29

Additionally, the court suggested, by its reference to City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center,30 that challenges dealing with discrimination
based on mental incapacity should be analyzed using the rational basis

19. Jaramillo, Ill N.M. at 725, 809 P.2d at 639.
20. Id. Mrs. Jaramillo claimed that the two were similar because they both implicated the right
of access to the courts.
21. Id. The defendants directed the court's attention to two New Mexico decisions. In Sena
School Bus Co. v. Board of Education, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1984), the court
of appeals upheld different limitation periods for governmental entities as opposed to private entities.
Additionally, in Espanola Housing Authority v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787, 568 P.2d 1233 (1977), the
supreme court upheld different limitation periods for different government entities.
22. Jaramillo, Ill N.M. at 724-25, 809 P.2d at 638-39.
23. Richardson, 107 N.M. at 698, 763 P.2d at 1163.
24. Jaramillo, Ill N.M. at 725, 809 P.2d at 639.
25. Richardson, 107 N.M. at 698, 763 P.2d at 1163.
26. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 623-24, 798 P.2d at 573-74.
27. Jaramillo, III N.M. at 725, 809 P.2d at 639.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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test.3' Thus, it appears the court felt compelled to follow the United
States Supreme Court and analyze challenges to the limitation period of
the Tort Claims
Act based on mental incapacity and using the rational
32
basis test.
Finally, the court held that the statute did not discriminate against
Lawrence Jaramillo because of his mental incapacity, but instead, classified
the length of limitation periods for the filing of claims based on the
characteristics of the defendant.3 3 Consequently, the court held that the
statute did not implicate a sensitive class as Mrs. Jaramillo suggested
and should, therefore, be analyzed using the rational basis test. 34
b. Rational Basis Test
Rational basis analysis requires that the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute prove that there is no rational basis for the
statute. 3' Without such proof, the statute is presumed to be constitutional. 36 The court found that section 41-4-15(A) of the Tort Claims Act
did not violate Lawrence Jaramillo's equal protection rights, as the statute
37
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Among those interests, the court reasoned that the legislature was
concerned that claims against the government may significantly outnumber
claims against private entities due to the expansive nature of state government operations. 3 The court suggested that this dynamic increases the
burden of investigating potential claims as well as the danger of stale
claims. 39 Additionally, a strict interpretation of the statute of limitations
allows government entities to predict as well as control the number of
claims brought against it. 40 The court held that all of these concerns are
rationally related to the legislature's exclusion of the tolling provision
from the Tort Claims Act. 4' Consequently, the statute of limitations did
not offend Mr. Jaramillo's constitutional rights. 42
Mrs. Jaramillo argued that New Mexico precedent holds that statutes
of limitations will only be interpreted literally if such an interpretation
does not result in injustice. 43 Nevertheless, the court of appeals believed
the result here would be no more unjust than any other case where a

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Jaramilo, 11I N.M. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725-26, 809 P.2d
Id. at 725, 809 P.2d at
Id. at 726, 809 P.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.

725, 809 P.2d at 639.

at 639-40.
639.
640.

41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id. Mrs. Jaramillo relied on Regents of University of New Mexico v. Armijo, 103 N.M.
183, 704 P.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1984) (statute of limitations will be interpreted literally so long as
the interpretation does not result in injustice, absurdity, or contradiction).
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claim was terminated by the expiration of the limitation period and,
therefore, rejected this argument."
c. Due Process
In addition to her equal protection claim, Mrs. Jaramillo argued that
the statute of limitations for the Tort Claims Act violated her son's due
process rights for two reasons.4 5 First, she asserted that the time period
for the filing of a claim under the statute is unreasonable." Additionally,
she argued that the statute precluded the right of action of an incompetent
person exclusively on the incompetent's inability to comply with the
statute/4
The court of appeals found the plaintiff's argument regarding the
unreasonableness of the statute to be unpersuasive, as the precedent cited
by Mrs. Jaramillo only concerned provisions requiring notice of a claim
to be filed within thirty, sixty, or ninety days of the event resulting in
liability." The court of appeals conceded that it had previously found
some notice provisions to be due process violations; however, these
findings were limited to ninety-day notice provisions. 49 The court found
that because section 41-4-15(A) provided two years to file a claim, rather
than ninety days, the statute was not unreasonable and therefore did not
violate Jaramillo's due process rights.50
Furthermore, regarding Mrs. Jaramillo's claim that the statute was
violative because it bars an incompetent person's right of action based
on his inability to comply, the court found that the statute's denial of
the right to file a claim was based on a lapse of time rather than the
plaintiff's mental disability.5 5Therefore, it did not violate Lawrence
Jaramillo's due process rights. 1
Finally, Mrs. Jaramillo argued that the statute of limitations should
have been tolled during Lawrence Jaramillo's mental disability. 53 The
court found no legal support for this contention, as all the precedent
cited by Mrs. Jaramillo concerned statutes that contained tolling provisions.Y The court chose not to read a tolling provision into the Tort

44. Jaramillo, Il1 N.M. at 726, 809 P.2d at 640.
45. Id. at 726-27, 809 P.2d at 640-41.
46. Id. at 726, 809 P.2d at 640.
47. Id. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
48. Id. at 726-27, 809 P.2d at 640-41 (citing City of Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So. 2d 917
(Fla. 1952); Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970); Randolph v.
City of Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S.W. 449 (1923); City of Wazahachie v. Harvey, 255 S.W.2d
549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)).
49. Id. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641; cf. Tafoya v. Doe 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App.
1983) and Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244 (Ct. App.
1982).
50. Jaramillo, II1 N.M. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Klamm Shell v. Berg, 165 Colo. 540, 441 P.2d 10 (1968); Pannell v. Glidewell,
146 Miss. 565, 111 So. 571 (1927); Dumas v. Agency for Child Development-New York City Head
Start, 569 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Foster v. Allbright, 631 S.W.2d 147 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1982).
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Claims Act." Indeed, the statute explicitly states that the limitation applies
to all persons regardless of minority or legal disability.5 6
Because the court was not convinced that Lawrence Jaramillo's equal
protection and due process rights were violated, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court order dismissing Mrs. Jaramillo's claim with
prejudice. 57 The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari."
Jaramillo v. State exemplifies the New Mexico courts' commitment to
a literal, textual interpretation of the statute of limitations for the Tort
Claims Act. Consequently, anyone who is injured at the hands of the
state or any other government entity, but is unable to file suit within
the two year period, will not be compensated for his injuries.5 9
By refusing to extend the time period of the statute of limitations, a
government entity will be able to predict more accurately the amount of
litigation pending against it. Such a refusal may reduce litigation costs
of government entities, as the number of claims actually litigated would
decline. The court of appeals' interpretation of the statute of limitations
exemplifies its belief that predictability of litigation, as well as the costs
both of judgment and litigation, was of utmost concern to the legislature
when it contemplated suits against government entities. Indeed, the legislature made the time limit to file suit shorter than any other tort claim
against a private tortfeasor and provided only one exception to that time
limit.6
C. Immunity of Government Entities
1.

The Law Enforcement Exception:
Concurrent and Vicarious Liability of Government Entities
Under the Tort Claims Act, law enforcement officers acting within the
scope of their duties are not immune from suit when their actions cause
personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death, or property damage resulting from a wrong enumerated in the statute.6 1 Under the Act, there
are three requirements that a plaintiff suing a government entity must
satisfy. First, the plaintiff must establish that the harm that is the subject
of the suit was caused by a law enforcement officer. 62 Second, the harm
must manifest itself in the form of bodily or personal injury, wrongful

55. Jaramillo, I !1 N.M. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).

57. Jaramillo, I I I N.M. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
58. 111 N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991).
59. The only exception to this rule applies to minors under the age of seven, who are given
until their ninth birthday to file a claim. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
60. See supra note 59.
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
62. Id.
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death, or property damage. 63 Finally, the harm must be a result of one
of the enumerated wrongs articulated in the statute. 64
Generally, only those persons whose principal duties include those of
65
a direct law enforcement nature are not immune under the act. Nevertheless, New Mexico courts have waived immunity for governmental
of their
entities if they would be vicariously liable for non-immune acts
6
employees under traditional notions of respondeat superior.
Currently, it appears that under the law enforcement exception of the
Tort Claims Act a plaintiff may sue the law enforcement officer whose
negligence caused the harm as well as any governmental entity that
67
exercised immediate supervisory control over that officer. Finally, in
some instances, the courts may hold law enforcement officers liable for
injuries that they did not directly cause. 8 A negligent act on the part
of an officer that results in injury caused by a third party may result
in the officer's liability. 69 In these instances, government entities may
of their employee under traditional
also be held liable for the negligence
70
superior.
respondeat
of
notions
In California First Bank v. State,71 sheriff's deputies observed an
obviously intoxicated man come out of a bar, get in his truck, and drive
away. The man subsequently crossed the center line with his truck and
hit another vehicle. Three people were killed and one was seriously
injured.

72

California First Bank, as a personal representative of the decedents
and as the guardian of the one survivor, filed a wrongful death and
personal injury action against the New Mexico State Highway Department,
the Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control ("ABC"), the Board

63. Id.
64. Id. The harm must have resulted from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation of character, violation of property
rights, or deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitutions and laws
of the United States or New Mexico.
65. See generally Anchondo v. Corrections Dep't, 100 N.M. 108, 666 P.2d 1255 (1983); Wittkowski
v. State Corrections Dep't, 103 N.M. 526, 710 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1985); Abalos v. Bernalillo
County Dist. Attorney's Office, 105 N.M. 554, 734 P.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1987). In these cases, the
court of appeals and the supreme court have equated "duties of a direct enforcement nature" with
the duty to maintain public order and the act of holding persons in custody.
66. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
67. Id. at 477, 745 P.2d at 385.
68. Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984) (Bernalillo County
Sheriff's Department held liable for failing to respond to an emergency call when plaintiff was
raped and tortured as a result of the sheriff's department's inaction); Methola v. County of Eddy,
95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980) (waiver of immunity for battery extends to battery committed
by third party when battery was proximately caused by the negligence of law enforcement officers).
69. Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
70. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
71. 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990).
72. Id. at 66, 801 P.2d at 648. Despite the characterization of Eddie's Bar and other bars as
"Indian Bars" which encourage drinking to excess, the City of Gallup and McKinley County
subscribed to a policy of non-interference with the drinking activities of these bars. Indeed, law
enforcement officers were instructed not to enter the bars to enforce liquor control laws. Officers
were further instructed not to apprehend or arrest persons driving under the influence of alcohol.
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of Commissioners of73 the County of McKinley ("County") and the City
of Gallup ("City").
California First Bank's complaint alleged that sheriff's deputies observed
the driver's behavior and failed to apprehend or arrest him. The Bank
alleged that the Gallup Police Department and the Sheriff's Department
and its employees "were acting in their capacities as agents, servants or
employees of the City and County." The complaint alleged that the City
and the County had established, and its employees complied with, a
policy of not enforcing liquor control laws. Finally, this policy of nonenforcement resulted in the failure of the sheriff's officers to pursue the74
driver despite the knowledge that he threatened the safety of others.
The district court dismissed the complaint against the County, the City,
75
and ABC.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal against the
County while affirming the dismissal of the claims against ABC and the
City. 76 The court of appeals found that because the State Highway
Department, ABC, the County, and the City were not law enforcement
officers within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, 77 they were not
directly liable for the harm caused. 78 Additionally, the four defendants
did not have a duty to the victims to promulgate policies of active
enforcement of liquor-control and drunk driving laws. 79 Therefore, they
could not be held directly liableA°
The court of appeals suggested another theory under which California
First Bank could recover from the County on behalf of the victims. The
court reasoned that the County might be vicariously liable to the "bank
if [the bank were able to) prove that the McKinley County Board of
County Commissioners 'exercised immediate supervisory authority over
sheriff's
deputies' whose negligence was alleged to have caused a bat'
tery."'
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
possible liability of the defendants under two different theories. 82 First,

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 66-67, 801 P.2d at 648-49.
77. Id.; see Anchondo v. Corrections Dep't, 100 N.M. 108, 666 P.2d 1255 (1983); Abalos v.
Bernalillo County Dist. Attorney's Office, 105 N.M. 554, 734 P.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
quashed, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987). Anchondo and Abalos define "law enforcement officer"
as one who has a duty to maintain public order and engages in the act of holding persons in
custody.
78. California First Bank, Ill N.M. at 66-67, 801 P.2d at 648-49.
79. Id. at 66, 801 P.2d at 648.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 67, 801 P.2d at 649. The court relied on Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d
380 (1987), which held that there was no immunity for a governmental entity who is vicariously
liable for the non-immune acts of public employees under traditional notions of respondeat superior,
and Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980), in which the supreme court
ruled that a battery committed by a third party which was proximately caused by the negligence
of law enforcement officers gives rise to a waiver of immunity for battery under the Tort Claims
Act.
82. California First Bank, Ill N.M. at 66, 801 P.2d at 648.
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the court considered the bank's allegation that the County and the City
are directly liable to the bank as concurrent governmental tortfeasors13
In considering this argument, the court was required to decide the scope
of governmental entities which can be held liable under the law enforcement officer exception of the Tort Claims Act.
The bank claimed that immunity of governmental entities is waived
under section 41-4-12 of the Tort Claims Act because they are concurrent
tortfeasors and are directly liable when a law enforcement officer causes
an occurrence for which immunity is waived under the Act.84 The bank
reasoned that the defendant's direct liability stemmed from a policy of
nonenforcement to which law enforcement officers subscribed, making
them concurrent tortfeasors15
The bank further reasoned that section 41-4-12 does not limit waiver
of immunity to law enforcement agencies. The bank argued that any

government entity waives immunity when it engages in injury-producing
conduct for which liability is waived when caused by law enforcement

officers. 6 As the State argued, however, allowing a plaintiff to sue on
a theory of concurrent governmental tortfeasors could conceivably result
in the joinder of "an indefinite number of defendants as to whom none
by establishing a
of the waiver provisions of the [Act] directly apply,"
7

chain of causation among governmental entities.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the extension of liability
to any and all governmental entities under the law enforcement exception
of the Act was in derogation of the structure of the Act.88 The court
reasoned that the Act was specific with respect to conduct for which

immunity of an employee or his agency is waived, and found that if the

legislature had intended to waive immunity for all government entities
who might be concurrent tortfeasors it would have expressly stated so
in the Act.89 Therefore, because the legislature did not expressly provide
for waiver of immunity for the City and the County as concurrent
tortfeasors, their immunity was not waived under this theory. 9°
Next, the supreme court considered the court of appeals' suggestion
that the County may be vicariously liable under traditional notions of
respondeat superior if the bank proves that sheriff's deputies were under
the direct supervisory control of the County Commissioners and the
perpetrator of the alleged battery specifically intended it. 91 In determining
that the County may be held vicariously liable, the supreme court articulated the necessary conditions under which liability exists.9

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 67-68, 801 P.2d at 649-50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68, 801 P.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68-69, 801 P.2d at 650-51.
Id.
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The supreme court reasoned that vicarious liability based on traditional
notions of respondeat superior is established in one of two ways.93 First,
a right to control based on a master-servant relationship is sufficient to
establish vicarious liability.9 Second, vicarious liability is established by
a master's actual control over a servant. 95 The court limited vicarious
liability to situations where the master has "act[ed] in . . . a manner
that reasonably may be interpreted as indicating a willingness" that the
servant perform the services.9
In the case at hand, the court found that despite the fact that the
County may not have possessed statutory authority" or a contractual
right to control, the bank's complaint adequately alleged a master-servant
relationship between officers and the County with respect to enforcement
of certain laws because deputies implemented an express county policy. 9
With respect to the County's vicarious liability, the court further held
that the immunity of a government entity can only be waived under the
law enforcement provision if an officer causes the deprivation of a right
guaranteed by the constitutions and laws of the United States or New
Mexico as required by the Act.9 California First Bank argued that failure
to enforce liquor control laws violated the plaintiff's right secured under
section 29-1-1 of the New Mexico statutes, which articulates the duties
of law enforcement officers. 100

93. Id. at 69, 801 P.2d at 651.

94. Id. (citing Silva, 106 N.M. 472, 477, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (1987)).
95. Id. at 69-70, 801 P.2d at 651-52. The court considered numerous provisions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) in defining a master-servant relationship. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) §§ 220, 225. Additionally, the court pointed out that a master is not
excused from liability because the servant performed services voluntarily, or under duress. California
First Bank, 111 N.M. at 69, 801 P.2d at 651 (citing McCauley v. Ray, 80 N.M. 171, 180, 453
P.2d 192, 201 (1968) and United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1356 (3d Cir. 1972)).
96. California First Bank, 111 N.M. at 70, 801 P.2d at 652 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 225 comment c); see also Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. App. 571, 499
P.2d 185 (1972).
97. California First Bank, 111 N.M. at 70, 801 P.2d at 652. The court of appeals examined
the possibility that statutory authority for the purpose of vicarious liability may stem from N.M.
STAT. ANN. section 4-41-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), which allows counties to establish "a merit system
for the hiring, promotion, discharge and general regulation of the deputies and the employees of
the county sheriff's office." California First Bank, 111 N.M. at 69, 801 P.2d at 651. The supreme
court found that the statute does not give the County the authority to control the details of a
sheriff deputy's work. Id. at 70, 801 P.2d at 652.
98. California First Bank, 111 N.M. at 70, 801 P.2d at 652.
99. Id. at 71, 801 P.2d at 653. The court reasoned that "laws" under N.M. STAT. ANN. section
41-4-12, encompasses at least statutory law. It further found that immunity is waived when there
is a violation of a right guaranteed by either the constitution or by the laws, dismissing the possibility
that the violation must be of a right guaranteed by both the laws and the constitution. California
First Bank, 111 N.M. at 71, 801 P.2d at 653.
100. Id. at 70-71, 801 P.2d at 652-53. N.M. STAT. ANN. section 29-1-1 states:
It is hereby declared to be the duty of every sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable and
every other peace officer to investigate all violations of the criminal laws of the
state which are called to the attention of any such officer or of which he is aware,
and it is also declared the duty of every such officer to diligently file a complaint
or information, if the circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonably prudent
person that such action should be taken, and it is also declared his duty to cooperate
with and assist the attorney general, district attorney or other prosecutor, if any,
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The court found that the bank properly alleged a violation of a right
secured by New Mexico law. 10 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
used the two-prong test applied by federal courts to determine whether
a statute secures a right under the federal law enforcement exception. 0 2
First, the court considered "whether the legislation creates a right on
the part of specific individuals." 1' 3 The court found that section 29-1-1
of the Tort Claims Act created an individual right.10 Second, the legislative
remedy must not explicitly or implicitly preclude a private cause of action
under the Tort Claims Act for a law enforcement officer's negligent
failure to perform his duties. 10The court found that the remedies provided
for in section 29-1-1 do not preclude tort liability under the Tort Claims
Act.'°0 Additionally, the court reasoned that permitting personal injury
actions against governmental agencies who employed law enforcement
officers under the Tort Claims Act. encourages better training and supervision of officers.' °7
Thus, the bank successfully asserted a claim of vicarious liability against
the County, as it properly alleged the County's control over sheriff's
I
deputies and the violation of a right secured by New Mexico laws. 10
The supreme court remanded the case for further proceedings.' °9
Later in the survey period, the court of appeals considered the vicarious
liability of a private Corporation operating a state prison accused of
negligent training and supervision of subordinate employees under the
law enforcement exception of the Tort Claims Act. In McDermitt v.
CorrectionsCorp. of America, 10 the plaintiff alleged that her son's suicide,
which occurred while he was incarcerated in the Santa Fe Detention
Center, was a result of the negligent training and supervision of guards
working in the detention center at the time of her son's death."' The
district court denied the motion of the Corrections Corporation of America
("CCA") for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for
2
negligent supervision or training."

in all reasonable ways. Such cooperation shall include the prompt reporting of all
arrests for liquor law violations at licensed liquor establishments to the department
of alcoholic beverage control. Failure to perform his duty in any material way shall
subject such officer to removal from office and payment of all costs of prosecution.
101. California First Bank, Ill N.M. at 71, 801 P.2d at 653.
102. Id.at 74, 801 P.2d at 656.
103. Id.
104. Id.(citing Schear v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984)).
105. Id.
106. Id. The court found that the remedies in section 29-1-1 are not so comprehensive that the
imposition of tort liability would frustrate the purpose of the statute.
107. Id. at 74-75, 801 P.2d at 656-57.
108. Id. at 71-76, 801 P.2d at 653-58. The court found that the bank had not alleged a violation
of a right secured under the federal constitution and did not reach the question of a violation of
rights under the New Mexico Constitution. Id. at 75-76, 801 P.2d at 657-58.
109. Id. at 76, 801 P.2d at 657.
110. 112 N.M. 247, 814 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1991). Neither party questioned the applicability of
the Tort Claims Act to a private jailer.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 248, 814 P.2d at 116.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals granted an interlocutory appeal to
consider whether the Tort Claims Act provides a waiver of immunity
resulting from law enforcement officers' negligent supervision or training
of their subordinates. 3 The court of appeals held that when a subordinate
law enforcement officer violates the rights of an individual and the
violation results in personal injury, immunity is waived for negligent
supervision or training by superior law enforcement officers who proximately caused that violation." 4 The court stressed that for waiver of
immunity for negligent supervision to occur, there must be a violation
of a right secured under the constitutions or laws of the United States
or New Mexico.' This requirement represents no deviation from the
6
requirement of the Act."
The court of appeals held that McDermitt's complaint properly alleged
the negligent training and supervision of CCA's employees, resulting in
the deprivation of McDermitt's son's rights and his subsequent death. 7
The court further rejected the district court's broad construction of the
law enforcement exception."'
While the district court interpreted Methola v. County of Eddy" 9 and
Silva v. State'20 to hold that immunity is waived by section 41-4-12 when
a law enforcement officer's negligent failure to supervise results in personal
injury, 2' the court of appeals confined this liability to injuries that were
proximately caused by certain torts enumerated in that section of the
Act or a violation of rights.1' 2 Thus, McDermitt could not recover for
negligent training or supervision unless she was able to prove either a
tort listed in the law enforcement exception, or a deprivation of rights
secured by the United States or New Mexico Constitution or laws. 23 The
24
court remanded the case to district court for further proceedings.
The court of appeals applied the reasoning articulated in California
First Bank v. State to a corrections facility. In California First Bank,
the supreme court rejected an expansive interpretation of the scope of
the law enforcement exception of the Tort Claims Act that would permit
a plaintiff to join as concurrent tortfeasors any government entity that
could be linked in the chain of causation. 25 Instead, it adopted a less

113. Id.

114. Id. at 249, 814 P.2d at 117.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
120. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
121. McDermitt, 112 N.M. at 248, 814 P.2d at 116. The court found Silva v. State, 106 N.M.
472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987), inapplicable, as it did not interpret N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12, and
stated that in Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1981), the injury suffered
was caused by a tort enumerated within the law enforcement exception. Therefore, Methola was
not helpful. Id.
122. McDermitt, 112 N.M. at 248, 814 P.2d at 117.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See California First Bank v. State, I11 N.M. 64, 66-68, 801 P.2d 646, 648-50 (1990).
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drastic interpretation that permits the plaintiff to sue any government
entity if that entity has a right to control or actually controls the employees
a
alleged to have done the harm and the plaintiff was deprived of 26
statutory or constitutional right as a result of the employee's conduct.
When these two criteria are met, the plaintiff
can sue a government
27
entity under a theory of vicarious liability.
As a result of this interpretation of section 41-4-12 of the Tort Claims
Act, plaintiffs harmed by the behavior of law enforcement officers will
have a greater pool of defendants from which to choose. Additionally,
if the plaintiff is able to prove that a government entity had a right to
control the officer and the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional or
statutory right, he is entitled to a jury instruction on respondeat superior,
which may clarify for the jury that a judgment would be paid by the
government entity rather than an individual officer accused of negligence,
which may prompt juries to award greater judgments to plaintiffs without
the fear of placing an extreme financial burden on an individual officer.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that an individual right was
implied in section 29-1-1 of the Tort Claims Act. ' 2 This statute outlines
the general duties of law enforcement officers, including the duty to
"investigate all violations of the criminal laws of the state which are
called to the attention of the officer."' 29 Due to the general nature of
the statute, the fact that the supreme court has recognized it as creating
an individual right may make it quite easy to prove that the plaintiff
was deprived of a statutory right, which is one of the two requirements
necessary to assert the vicarious liability of other government entities.
It is unlikely that the California First Bank ruling will result in a great
increase in the size of money judgments against defendants, as the Tort
30
Claims Act contains a cap on judgments against government entities.
Additionally, punitive damages are expressly precluded by the Act."'
Despite the fact that awards against government entities probably will
not be increased, the California First Bank decision may subject government entities to the increased chance of litigation. Any government
entity that has a right to control and actually controls law enforcement
officers may be subject to a lawsuit if an officer violates a statutory or
constitutional right of a plaintiff. It is possible that plaintiffs will name
numerous government entities as defendants, asserting that they meet the
two criteria for holding a government entity vicariously liable. As a result,
government entities will have to defend these claims, regardless of the
soundness of the plaintiff's assertion.

Id. at 68-72, 801 P.2d at 650-54.
Id.
Id.at 70-71, 801 P.2d at 652-53.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-1 (Repi. Pamp. 1990).
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 414-19 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
131. Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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2. The Highway Maintenance Exception
The Tort Claims Act provides a waiver of immunity for damage caused
by the negligence of public employees in the maintenance of any bridge,
culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk, or parking area.'3 2 New
Mexico courts have traditionally construed "maintenance" broadly.
"Maintenance" of a highway has been interpreted to include the in34
stallation of guardrails,'3 3 the maintenance of fences along the highway,
the installation of signals,'" and licensing of oversized vehicles. 3 6 In
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 3 7 the court of appeals found
that section 41-4-11 of the Tort Claims Act was intended to protect the
traveling public. The state highway department therefore has a statutory
duty to keep state roads safe. 138
In Romero v. State'39 Andrea Lucero and Toby Esquibel were killed
in a one-car accident on Rio Arriba County Road 41, when the car they
were riding missed a curve and hit a large tree. '40 Representatives of the
decedents filed suit against Rio Arriba County and the New Mexico State
Highway Department. 4 ' A jury found the defendants liable for 20.363%
142
and 17.027% of the injury, respectively.
The county and the department appealed. 43 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment against the highway department and
remanded for a new trial against the county'" after finding that Mrs.
Romero's expert testimony of the danger of the accident site was in45
admissible.
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered the
trial court's role when the parties differ on whether plaintiff's injuries
were caused by negligent maintenance or negligent plan or design.'4
Additionally, the supreme court determined the extent of the State Highway Department's duty to supervise the maintenance of roads within the
47
state that are not state highways.
The trial judge over the objection of the county and the state, permitted
testimony from Mrs. Romero's expert that County Road 41 was dangerous
because there was insufficient banking or superelevation on the curve of

132. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
133. Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980).
134. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894
(Ct. App. 1980).
135. Grano v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc. 99 N.M. 227, 656 P.2d 890 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433 (1983).
136. Miller v. New Mexico Dep't of Transportation, 106 N.M. 253, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987).
137. 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980).
138. Id.; Miller, 106 N.M. at 255, 741 P.2d at 1376.
139. 112 N.M. 291, 814 P.2d 1019 (Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Romero 1].
140. Id. at 293, 814 P.2d at 1021.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 302, 814 P.2d at 1030.
145. Id. at 296-98, 814 P.2d at 1024-26.
146. Romero v. State, 112 N.M. 332, 815 P.2d 628 (1991) [hereinafter Romero Ill.
147. Id. at 334-35, 815 P.2d at 630-31.
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the road.' The expert also claimed that the curve on49the road was sharp
and that the roadway had an insufficient shoulder.
On appeal, the county and the state asserted that the testimony was
inadmissible because it was pertinent to the plan or design of the road
for which a government entity cannot be held liable under the Tort
Claims Act.13 0 Mrs. Romero contended that the evidence was relevant to
the maintenance of the road and that section 41-4-11(A) of the Tort
Claims Act waived the state's and county's immunity for such defects. " ,
Finally, Mrs. Romero asserted that the state and the county cannot claim
immunity based on section 41-4-11(B)-the plan or design exemptionbecause neither the state nor the county were able to produce a plan or
design for County Road 41.112
The court of appeals held that features such as the width of shoulders
of a road, sharpness of curves, and other similar elements are relevant
to the design of the road and not its maintenance."' Additionally, the
court found the existence of a documented plan or design to be unimportant in the case at hand.'1
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' exclusion
of the expert testimony, finding that the court of appeals construed the
limitation of waiver found in section 41-4-11(B) too narrowly."' The court
of appeals found that the only question to be answered was whether the
roadway is as it was planned or designed.- 6 The supreme court rejected
this test, reasoning that the jury could not have answered this question
3 7
if it did not know the specifics of the plan or design of the roadway.
Thus, documentation of the plan or design of the roadway was crucial. "8
Without this documentation, the court said, a determination that the
features in question constitute design would be purely speculative. 5 9

148. Romero 1, 112 N.M. at 296, 814 P.2d at 1024.
149. Id.
150. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. section 41-4-11(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) states:
The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsection A of this
section shall not include liability for damages caused by:
(I) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street,
alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(2) the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
151. Romero 1, 112 N.M. at 296, 814 P.2d at 1024. N.M. STAT. ANN. section 41-4-11(A) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989) provides:
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of § 41-4-4 does not apply to
liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage
caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their
duties in the maintenance of or for the existence of any bridge, culvert, highway,
roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
152. Romero I, 112 N.M. at 296, 814 P.2d at 1024.
153. Id. at 297, 814 P.2d at 1025.
154. Id.

155. Romero 1I, 112 N.M. at 333, 815 P.2d at 629.
156. Romero I, 112 N.M. at 297, 814 P.2d at 1025.
157. Romero II, 112 N.M. at 333, 815 P.2d at 629.
158. Id. As was previously mentioned, the state and county were unable to find the plan to
County Road 41 when Mrs. Romero requested it during discovery. See supra text accompanying
note 152.
159. Romero II, 112 N.M. at 334, 815 P.2d at 630.
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The supreme court found that an analysis of the admissibility of the
expert testimony required a two-fold inquiry.16° First, the plan or design
of the road must be ascertained.' 6' Second, it must be determined whether
the evidence pertained solely to that plan or design. 62
In applying the appropriate standard of review, the supreme court held
that the trial court had not abused its discretion by allowing Mrs. Romero's
63
expert witness to testify to the dangerous condition of the road.
The supreme court also addressed whether the New Mexico State
Highway Department had a duty to supervise the maintenance of County
Road 41, and, if so, the scope of that duty.'" The supreme court found,
as did the court of appeals, that the State Highway Department had a
duty to supervise the maintenance of county roads. 65 The courts, however,
disagreed about the extent to which the Highway Department was required
to supervise.'66
The court of appeals held that the department had a statutory duty
to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to the maintenance of
county roads. 67 This duty stemmed from section 67-3-14 of the Tort
Claims Act which provided that "[t]he commission shall have charge of
all matters pertaining to the expenditure of the state road fund in the
... maintenance of public roads ... and shall do all things necessary
and expedient in the exercise of such supervision."' The court of appeals,
however, found that the department's duty to regulate maintenance provided for in section 67-3-14 was not encompassed within the duty to
maintain referred to in section 41-4-11(A) of the Tort Claims Act.'6
Therefore, the department was immune from suit when it negligently
70
regulated maintenance of non-state highways or roads.
The supreme court found that the department's duty articulated in
section 67-3-14 encompassed more than the issuance of regulations. 7' The
duties of the department may have even included the supervision of the
county's day-to-day maintenance of the roadway. 72 Therefore, the trial

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court cited Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 703 P.2d 925 (Ct. App.
1985), as the appropriate test for standard of review. Romero II, 112 N.M. at 333, 815 P.2d at
629.
164. Romero II,112 N.M. at 334, 815 P.2d at 630.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 334-35, 815 P.2d at 630-31.
167. Romero 1, 112 N.M. at 299, 814 P.2d at 1027.
168. Id. It must be noted that N.M. STAT. ANN. section 67-3-14 (Cum. Supp. 1986), which was
applied in this case, was amended in 1989. The amended statute added that, "the commission shall
have no duty to maintain or supervise the maintenance of roads which are not designated state
highways or bridges." The added language suggests that it was not intended that the state be liable
for the negligent maintenance of county roads or other non-state roads. Thus, had the 1989 law
been applicable in this case, Mrs. Romero would not have been able to recover from the state, as
the state would have no duty to maintain or supervise non-state roads.
169. Romero 1, 112 N.M. at 299-300, 814 P.2d at 1027-28.
170. Id.
171. Romero I, 112 N.M. at 334, 815 P.2d at 630.
172. Id.
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court did not err in permitting the jury to consider the liability of the
73 The supreme court reinstated the judgment of the
highway department.
174
court.
trial
The holding of Romero II has limited applicability to the interpretation
of provisions of the Tort Claims Act. In instances when it is not clear
whether evidence is applicable to prove negligent maintenance or design,
it is for the trial court to determine whether such evidence is admissible. 75
This ruling merely reaffirms the general assumption that the trial court
is in the best position to determine the relevance of evidence. Romero
II also teaches that, prior to 1989, the New Mexico State Highway
Department had a duty to supervise the maintenance of all New Mexico
may have included the day-to-day supervision
roads and that this duty 76
of highway maintenance.
This duty has been altered, however, by the New Mexico Legislature,
which amended section 67-3-14 of the Tort Claims Act in 1989.' 77 Consequently, the State Highway Department no longer has a duty to maintain
or supervise the maintenance of roads that are not designated as state
highways or bridges. 7 8 Therefore, the State Highway Department can no
longer be sued for the negligent supervision of maintenance of non-state
roads. Instead, plaintiffs injured as a result of negligent supervision of
non-state roads will have to sue the government entity directly responsible
for the maintenance of the road on which the plaintiff was injured.
II.

INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A.

Introduction
Causes of action for emotional distress were first recognized by New
Mexico courts in Mantz v. Follingstad'7 in 1972. The Mantz court
articulated the typical elements of a cause of action in intentional infliction
of emotional distress, relying on an Oregon case' ° that modifies the rule
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 (1965). Under
this test the conduct must be extreme and outrageous as well as intentional
or reckless. 8' Additionally, the conduct must result in severe emotional
distress. 8 2 The Mantz court, however, did not apply the rule, finding

173. Id. at 334-35, 815 P.2d at 630-31.
174. Id. at 335, 815 P.2d at 631.
175. Id. at 334, 815 P.2d at 630.
176. Id.
177. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-3-14 (Cum. Supp. 1992); see also supra note 168.
178. Id.
179. 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1972).
180. Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971).
181. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 479-80, 505 P.2d at 74-75; see also Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211,
638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
182. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 479-80, 505 P.2d at 74-75; see also Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211,
638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
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no merit in plaintiff's claim. 83 In the 1981 decision of Dominguez v.
Stone,' " the court of appeals once again relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in addressing whether a plaintiff could recover for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from statements made
by the defendant concerning the plaintiff's alienage and ethnicity. 85 Both
the Mantz and the Dominguez courts considered emotional distress in
situations where the claimant was the intended recipient of the harm
which gave rise to the claim.
In Ramirez v. Armstrong,'" the supreme court first considered whether
a bystander could recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Ramirez, the court adopted four criteria to apply to actions for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 87 First, a marital or intimate
familial relationship must exist between the victim and the claimant.'8 8
Second, the shock of the incident must be severe and result from a direct
emotional impact caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of
the incident. 8 9 Third, the emotional injury must manifest itself physically.19' Finally, the incident must result in the physical injury or death
of the victim.' 9' In addition to these four criteria, a claimant must also
successfully prove another negligence claim recognized under established
principles of tort law.' 92
During the 1990-91 survey period, the New Mexico appellate courts
considered two significant cases involving claims of emotional distress.
First, the supreme court considered the requirement that the emotional
distress must manifest itself physically. 93 Second, the court of appeals
determined whether claims for emotional distress could be brought by
one spouse against another.'9
B.

Physical Manifestation Requirement of Emotional Distress
The New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the physical manifestation
requirement of emotional distress in Folz v. State.' 95 In 1981, during a
highway reconstruction project, a truck experiencing brake failure collided
with five cars moving in the opposite direction.1'6 As a result of the

183. Mantz, 84 N.M. at 480, 505 P.2d at 75.
184. 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
185. Id. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
186. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
187. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26.
188. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825. The court limited these "familial relationships ... to husband
and wife, parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister and to those persons
who occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis." Id.
189. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26. The court commented that the plaintiff could not have
simply learned of the accident after its occurrence and base his claim on such knowledge.
190. Id. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826.
191. Id.
192. Id. Ramirez additionally asserted a claim for wrongful death. Id. at 543, 673 P.2d at 827.
193. Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990).
194. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d
575 (1991).
195. 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990).

196. Id. at 460, 797 P.2d at 249.
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collision, Sylvester Folz was killed, his wife suffered multiple injuries,
and their son, Steven, died several days later from injuries suffered in
the accident."
Mrs. Folz witnessed the death of her husband as she extracted herself
from the car. 19 As she tried to remove Steven from the car, she heard
1
him repeatedly scream, "Daddy, don't die, Daddy, please don't die."'
At trial, the physician who treated Mrs. Folz testified that she was shaken
and pale and required medication to relax her, as she was upset about
her son.2°° Additionally, she suffered from a mild head injury and a
mild cervical spine injury.20'
Folz was
A few days after being discharged from the hospital, Mrs.
2 2
rehospitalized and diagnosed with a fractured rib and ileus. 0 The doctor
a reasonable medical
expressed, that in his expert opinion, it was within
2
3
probability that the ileus was stress-induced .
Mrs. Folz and others injured in the collision sued the New Mexico
State Highway Department, claiming that the defendants negligently controlled traffic in the construction area.20 Additionally, Mrs. Folz claimed
that the department negligently inflicted emotional distress on her as a
result of its negligent control of traffic.20
The Folz court considered the four factors articulated in Ramirez v.
Armstronge necessary to recover successfully for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress. The court took this opportunity to reconsider the
third requirement that there must be a physical manifestation of or physical
injury to the claimant resulting from the injury.20
In reconsidering the requirement that the emotional, distress manifest
itself physically, the court re-examined the three rules considered by the
Ramirez court when determining the boundaries of liability for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.2m It also considered the manner in which
other jurisdictions handle the requirement of a physical manifestation of
the distress.I
The impact rule permits a bystander to recover only when the bystander
210 While
is physically injured by the same force that injured the victim.
197. Id. at 461, 797 P.2d at 250.
198. Id.at 468, 797 P.2d at 257.
199. Id.

200. Id.Additionally, she complained of a headache and backache. She also had scratches on
her forehead and body. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.Ileus, the doctor explained, is a blockage of the intestinal tract. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 459-60, 797 P.2d at 248-49. Plaintiffs additionally sued Slurry Seal who contracted
with the State Highway Department to perform the construction. Id. at 459, 797 P.2d at 248.
205. Id.at 468, 797 P.2d at 257.
206. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
207. Folz, 110 N.M. at 468, 797 P.2d at 257.
208. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 540, 673 P.2d at 824. In Ramirez, the court considered the impact
rule, the zone of danger rule, and the Dillon rule, each of which has been employed by other
jurisdictions to limit the liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
209. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469-70, 797 P.2d at 258-59.
210. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469, 797 P.2d at 258 (citing Saechao v. Mastakoun, 78 Or. App. 340,
717 P.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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some courts find the impact rule helpful to clarify the relationship between
the compensation of the claimant and his status as a victim of the breach
of a duty, 21' many others have abolished it altogether. 212
By comparison, the zone of danger rule is less restrictive than the
impact rule. It permits a bystander to recover only if he was within the
zone of danger of the physical impact that injures or kills another.21 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court considered the holding of Bovsun v.
Sanper 14 in which the court applied the zone of danger rule, holding
that plaintiffs can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when a serious injury or death occurs to an immediate family member
if the plaintiff was also exposed to the same risk of bodily injury or
21
death. "

The Dillon rule,2 16 which rejects the limitations of both the zone of
danger and the impact rules, bases liability on the foreseeability of the
risk of injury. 217 According to the Dillon rule, liability is based on the
plaintiff's proximity to the accident, his contemporaneous observation of
the accident, and his relationship to the victim. 218
The New Mexico Supreme Court chose to modify the Dillon rule when
it recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in

Ramirez v. Armstrong.2 9 The court pointed out that at least one jurisdiction found the Dillon requirements to be too stringent and held that

a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress if it was reasonably

foreseeable that emotional distress would result from the facts of the

case.220 In deciding whether Mrs. Folz could recover for the emotional

distress she experienced as a result of seeing her husband killed, the
supreme court considered the Ohio decision of Paugh v. Hanks.'22
The Ohio court explained that the rationale behind the elimination of
the requirement that the emotional distress physically manifest itself is
the belief that the other requirements of the cause of action test the
authenticity of the claim and the requirement that a physical injury exist
should not bar recovery.m Evidence of such a physical injury should be

211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986)).
213. Id. (citing Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984)).
214. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
215. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469, 797 P.2d at 258.
216. The Dillon rule was developed by the California courts in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
217. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469, 797 P.2d at 258.
218. Id.
219. Id.; see Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
220. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469, 797 P.2d at 258 (citing Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451
N.E. 2d 759 (1983)). The Ohio courts chose not to require a physical manifestation of the distress.
Traditionally, such a physical manifestation has been required to ensure that the injury to the
plaintiff is severe enough to justify compensation. Id. (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass.
540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982)).
221. Id. at 469-70, 797 P.2d at 258-59 (citing Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d
759 (1983)).
222. Id. (citing Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 77, 451 N.E.2d at 765, which adopted the reasoning
of Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974)). The New Mexico Supreme
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only as it applies to the degree of the mental or emotional
admissible
2
distress. 2
Instead of focusing on the physical manifestations of emotional distress,
the Paugh court focused on the degree of the distress as the threshold
a plaintiff
issue in initiating a cause of action.22 The Ohio court held that
225
could recover for emotional distress if two criteria were met. First, the
' 226 Second, "a reaemotional injury must be "severe and debilitating.
the mental
sonable person ... would be unable to cope adequately' 22with
7 A later Ohio
distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.
ruling extended the holding in Paugh. In Binns v. Fredendall,m the Ohio
Supreme Court held that when physical injury resulted from the accident,
his emotional distress resulting from the negligence of another did not
have to be "severe and debilitating" in order for the plaintiff's claim
to be successful. 229
After taking into consideration the criteria required by other jurisdictions to recover for a claim of emotional distress, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that New Mexico should not require a physical
manifestation of injury to prove successfully negligent infliction of emotional distress. 230 This holding altered the requirements set out in Ramirez
distress of
v. Armstrong, which previously required that the emotional
23'
injury.
or
manifestation
physical
a
in
result
the plaintiff
Instead, the court held that the "genuineness of such a232claim" is
First, a
sufficiently guaranteed if the plaintiff proves three things.
and the
victim
the
between
exist
must
relationship
marital or family
23 3 Second, the plaintiff's distress was a result of the contemplaintiff.
234 Finally,
poraneous sensory perception of the accident injuring the 2victim.
35
killed.
or
the victim must have been physically injured
The court generalized that emotional distress is typical and understandable in situations where a bystander witnesses the physical injury or death
of a family member and held that the three criteria previously articulated
ensure the legitimacy of a claim that seeks redress
were "sufficient ' to
236
for such a tort.
Court additionally recognized other jurisdictions which found that a physical manifestation of injury
was an artificial barrier to recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court cited
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Gammon
v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987); and Gates v. Richardson, 719
P.2d 193, 200 (Wyo. 1986).
223. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974).
224. Folz, 110 N.M. at 469, 797 P.2d at 258.
225. Id. (citing Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 78, 451 N.E.2d at 765).
226. Id.
227. Id.(quoting Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 78, 451 N.E.2d at 765).
228. 32 Ohio St. 3d 244, 245, 513 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1987).
229. Id.
230. Foiz, 110 N.M. at 470, 797 P.2d at 259.
231. See Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826.
232. Folz, 110 N.M. at 470, 797 P.2d at 259.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

In addition to altering the requirements to prove a cause of action in
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court addressed a plaintiff's
burden of proof of damages. 237 The court held that, while a physical
manifestation of emotional distress is admissible to prove the extent of
the plaintiff's injury, it is not the only measure of damages for emotional
distress .238 The court did not articulate the specific kind of proof necessary
to recover, but suggested that the jurors are in the best position to
determine the extent of the damage inflicted by a defendant's conduct
by drawing on their own experiences. 239
The supreme court found that Mrs. Folz's claim typified the unreasonableness of requiring a physical manifestation of injury to recover
for emotional distress.2 m The defendants argued that Mrs. Folz could
not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she did
not put on evidence of her injury resulting from that distress. 24' They
further claimed that because her physical injuries resulting from the
accident were not separable from any injuries she might have received
as a result of emotional distress, she could not recover for that distress ,2
While the court found that the defendants' characterization of the
evidence was correct, it found such a characterization irrelevant .2 3 Ironically, the court pointed out that the facts in the instant case would
satisfy the impact rule, which the court viewed as the most narrow rule
for recovery for emotional distress, as Mrs. Folz suffered physical injury
from the same force as the victim. 2 " The supreme court approved of
the characterization by former-District Judge Lorenzo Garcia of situations
where plaintiffs claiming emotional distress also suffer physical injuries
resulting from the accident itself:
Where the bystander receives a physical injury, apart from the emotional injury, you have a merging of the evidence, a merging of the
issues, and should the court impose such a stringent standard as to
require the doctor to say, well, this percent of the emotional injury
came from viewing the loss of a loved one, and this percent came
from pain and suffering in the accident or physical trauma in the
accident, it would place an unreasonable burden on a plaintiff.245
Additionally, the court determined that plaintiffs are not required to
introduce expert medical testimony to establish that an emotional injury
occurred. 2 "

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing with approval, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d
813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (Cal. 1980)).
240. Fokz, 110 N.M. at 470-471, 797 P.2d at 259-60.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 471, 797 P.2d at 260.
245. Id.
246. Id. The court held that expert medical testimony should be used when the court decides it
is necessary to inform the jury.
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Finally, the court held that Mrs. Folz had satisfied the three threshold
requirements for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.37
Consequently, the trial court properly submitted the claim to the248 jury
affirmed.
and the trial court judgment on emotional distress was
By no longer requiring that a plaintiff's emotional distress manifest
itself physically, New Mexico courts have opened the door to a number
of claims where the plaintiff has witnessed, by contemporaneous sensory
perception, the death of or injury to a family member, but suffered no
physical injury himself. Prior to the Folz ruling, people who witnessed
the death of a family member, no matter how gruesome or horrifying,
but did not suffer a physical manifestation of injury resulting from the
perception of the accident, were precluded from recovery for the emotional
harm they suffered. The New Mexico Supreme Court, by permitting a
plaintiff to sue successfully for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
without proving a physical injury, recognized that witnessing the death
or injury of a family member is an extreme and outrageous experience
in itself and that emotional injury does not always manifest itself physically. Therefore, plaintiffs who are able to prove the three remaining
criteria should be allowed to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, regardless of their own physical condition.
C. Emotional Distress in the Marital Context
The New Mexico Court of Appeals examined emotional distress in the
9
marital context in Hakkila v. Hakkila. Mr. and Mrs. Hakkila were
married in 1975 and separated in 1985.50 Mr. Hakkila25 filed a petition
for the dissolution of his marriage to Mrs. Hakkila. ' Mrs. Hakkila
counterclaimed, alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress
marriage. 25 2
resulting from her husband's treatment of her throughout their
After hearing the testimony, the district court concluded that Mrs.
Hakkila's mental health was characterized by acute depression and resulted
findings articin one psychotic episode.2 Additionally, the court made
254 The trial court
Hakkila.
Mr.
of
misconduct
intentional
ulating the
identified nine separate types of misconduct to which Mrs. Hakkila was

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575 (1991).
250. Id. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. The court noted that Mrs. Hakkila's mental condition was most obvious since her
separation from her husband. Additionally, the trial court identified inconsistent testimony concerning
Mrs. Hakkila's mental condition. One psychologist testified that Mrs. Hakkila was subject to a
borderline personality disorder which pre-dated her marriage to Mr. Hakkila. A second psychologist
testified that Mrs. Hakkila was an intellectualizing person who had suffered from acute depression
since 1981. All the experts agree, however, that Mrs. Hakkila was temporarily emotionally incapacitated at the time of the hearing. Id.
254. Id.
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subjected by her husband. 2 1 The trial court also found that Mr. Hakkila
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on his wife as a result of his
extreme and outrageous conduct. 2 6 Finally, the trial court deemed Mrs.
Hakkila to have been incompetent since 1981, tolling the statute of
limitations for purposes of her counterclaim. 257
The New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the record supported
a finding that several incidents of assault and battery took place. 258 The
court also took note of incidents in which Mr. Hakkila insulted or
screamed at his wife, both publicly and privately. 2 9 Additionally, the
court found that Mr. Hakkila had, on one occasion, locked Mrs. Hakkila
26
out of their home. 0
The court of appeals found that its first inquiry must be whether
intentional infliction of emotional distress should be recognized by New
Mexico courts in the marital context. 26' Intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires that the plaintiff prove first, that the defendant's conduct
rose to the degree of "extreme and outrageous"; second, that the conduct
was intentional or reckless; and third, that the conduct resulted in severe
emotional distress to the plaintiff. 262
Mr. Hakkila argued that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress should not be recognized in the marital context for public policy
reasons. 26a Mrs. Hakkila responded that the New Mexico Supreme Court's
recognition of the tort precluded the court of appeals from declining to
apply it in a marital context. 2"
The court of appeals looked to supreme court precedent to determine
whether such a tort was permissible; however, an examination of precedent
was not helpful. 265 Next, the court considered the ramifications and logic
255. Id. The trial court found that Mr. Hakkila assaulted and battered his wife, insulted her in
the presence of others, screamed at her in private and in the presence of others, locked her out
of the house overnight on one occasion, made repeated demeaning remarks about her sexuality,
continuously called her crazy, refused to allow her to pursue schooling or hobbies, refused to
participate in a normal marital relationship, and blamed his sexual inadequacies on his wife. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 173-74, 812 P.2d at 1321-22. Mr. Hakkila did not challenge the expiration of the
statute of limitations on appeal.
258. Id. at 174, 812 P.2d at 1332. The court of appeals noted at least four incidents identified
in the findings of the trial court in which Mr. Hakkila assaulted and battered his wife. In 1984,
after his wife pushed her finger into his chest, Mr. Hakkila grabbed her wrist and twisted it severely.
In 1981, while the couple was arguing, Mr. Hakkila grabbed his wife and threw her face-down
across the room, into a pot of dirt. On one occasion when Mrs. Hakkila was putting groceries
into their camper in 1978, Mr. Hakkila slammed part of the camper shell down on her head and
the trunk lid on her hands. Finally, the trial court found that Mr. Hakkila had battered his wife
in 1976 during consensual sexual intercourse by using excessive force. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 480, 505 P.2d 68, 75 (Ct. App. 1972); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 (1965).
263. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 174-75, 812 P.2d at 1322-23. The court did not list any of the policy
reasons which the defendant claimed precluded applying intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the marital context.
264. Id. at 175, 812 P.2d at 1323.
265. Id.
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of permitting a wife to sue her husband for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress." The court reasoned that it was necessary to take
the marital relationship into consideration when determining the scope
of a spouse's liability for emotional distress, as the intimacy of the family
relationship allowed family members to exhibit different behavior between
themselves than they would around others.2 7 The court relied heavily on
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to define the permissibility of recognizing emotional distress tort actions between family members.2 The
court pointed to sections of the Restatement that suggest the standard
of reasonable care should be relaxed in negligence cases between family
members. 269 Furthermore, the Restatement explains that physical contact
is common among family members and that "[fiamily romping, even
roughhouse play and momentary flares of temper not producing serious
0
hurt" must be expected between family members. 27 In determining the
liability of a spouse for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court of appeals examined numerous policy considerations supporting the
restriction on the scope of the tort.
With regard to the "extreme and outrageous" requirement, liability 27is1
not imposed for every act that was meant to cause emotional distress.
Instead, only those intentional or reckless acts of the defendant that are
extreme and outrageous and result in emotional distress can result in
liability. 272 This limitation, however, does not deviate from the requirement
infliction of emotional distress when the parties have no
for intentional
273
familial ties.
The "extreme and outrageous" limitation exists to protect the "safety
valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam.' '24
There are also many other reasons for the "extreme and outrageous"
in
requirement. The court justified some intentionally upsetting behavior 276
27 5 or in service of the greater social good,
pursuit of one's legal rights,
27 or one's
or for someone's own good. 277 Furthermore, a liberty interest,

266. Id.
267. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 (1965)).
268. Id.
269. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(F) (1965)).
270. Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(G) (1965)).
271. Id. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
272. Id.
273. See Dominguez v. State, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct.App. 1981); Mantz v. Follingstad,
84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1972).
274. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324 (quoting Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)). The court expressed the
need to preserve a freedom to vent emotions to maintain mental health. "The law," the court
stated, "should not require a degree of civility beyond our capacity."
275. Id. (citing Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLum. L. REV. 42, 57
(1982)). The court cited debt collections as one example in which one would be justified in intentionally
upsetting another.
276. Id. (citing cross-examination as one such greater social good).
277. Id. (citing basic training as one such example).
278. Id. (citing, Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 44 (1956)).
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interest in personal autonomy 2 79 may be at stake. Finally, the "extreme
and outrageous" requirement assures that there is sufficient injury and
causation for recovery, reducing the possibility of unfounded lawsuits. 28°
The court reasoned that when the defendant's behavior reaches the
level of "extreme and outrageous," the likelihood that the plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress is increased. 28' Additionally, it is more
likely that the distress was caused by the conduct of the defendant rather
282
than by an outside souce
Because torts in the intra-familial context should be treated with special
consideration, and the infliction of emotional distress is necessary and
useful in some situations,2 83 the court found that the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress should have a very limited scope within
the marital context. 2 4 The court reasoned that a limited scope was
especially vital because married people fight and high emotions may cause
one spouse to view the other's behavior as "extreme and outrageous"
when others do not. 285 Additionally, married couples who intend to "live
together for a lifetime have a right to criticize each other's behavior.' '286
In limiting the scope of emotional distress claims between spouses to
conduct that reaches the level of being extreme and outrageous, the court
found that three considerations mandate such a limitation in addition to
other public policy reasons based in current New Mexico law.287 First,
the court found it necessary to prevent litigation of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims where the behavior which the plaintiff claims
is extreme and outrageous is commonplace within the context of mar288
riage.
Second, the court felt compelled to protect conduct that is privileged
and therefore cannot be the basis for liability. 28 9 By limiting the scope
of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court attempted to safeguard intra-marital activity that is not usually the basis
for tort liability from disclosure in tort litigation. 29° Furthermore, New
279. Id. (citing Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406, (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Weicker v. Weicker,
22 N.Y.S.2d 732, 237 N.E.2d 876 (1968)).
280. Id. (citing Prosser, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 44).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
284. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176, 812 P.2d at 1324.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 177, 812 P.2d at 1325 (citing Cole, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Among
Family Members, 61 DEN. U.L. REv. 553, 574 (1984)).
287. Id.
288. Id. The court questioned the appropriateness of litigating a claim that it was extreme and
outrageous for one spouse to refuse to participate in sexual relations with another. Mr. Hakkila's
refusal to engage in sexual relations with his wife was only one of nine incidents making up the
misconduct which the trial court found to be extreme and outrageous. Id. (citing Thompson v.
Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that actions for alienation of
affections engender more harm than good)). The court did not discuss whether each incident had
to reach the level of "extreme and outrageous" for the plaintiff to recover, or if the outrageousness
of the incidents could be considered in the aggregate.
289. Id.

290. Id.
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Mexico courts also have an interest in avoiding groundless allegations of
causation. 291 The court found that proof of causation of emotional distress
2
is problematic in the marital context. 9 The link between outrageousness
293
of the conduct and the emotional distress will probably be obscure.
Additionally, the court found that public policy reasons require that
New Mexico courts approach intra-marital claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress cautiously. 29 ' One such reason is that New Mexico
29
typically avoids questioning why a marriage failed. This policy reason
is no doubt closely related to the privacy interests of the parties that
the courts found mandated the limitation of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the marital context. The court also
gave credence to the fact that New Mexico courts, while not abolishing
it, have frowned upon the tort of alienation of affection, recognizing
good. 29
that in many instances such actions do more harm than
Despite all of these concerns, the court found that because there had
not been an extremely high number of claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress in the marital context, there was no need to bar
the claim at this point. 29 Nevertheless, the court held that in order to
satisfy the three concerns that accompany claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress between spouses, courts must set the threshold of.
outrageousness high enough so that the "social good from recognizing
the tort will not be outweighed by the unseemly and invasive litigation
of meritless claims. ' 298 In the alternative, the circumstances in which the
be described precisely enough to satisfy the
tort is recognized should
29
test.
same balancing
In the case at bar, the court of appeals found that Mr. Hakkila's
behavior was not outrageous enough to constitute intentional infliction
3
of emotional distress in the marital context. 0 The court suggested, by
citing Sanders v. Lutz, 30 1 that Mr. Hakkila's behavior was not "beyond
all possible bounds of decency ... and utterly intolerable" and therefore,
not "outrageous" within the meaning of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 3 °0 Mr. Hakkila, the court believed, was privileged to refrain from
sexual relations with his wife? 3 Additionally, any other physical injuries
in emotional distress,
Mrs. Hakkila suffered at his hands did not result
' '3 04
discomfort.
or
pain
"transient
in
rather,
but
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 177-78, 812 P.2d at 1325-26.
295. Id. at 178, 812 P.2d at 1326 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989);
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32, 45 (1966)).
296. Id. (citing Thompson v. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1979)).
297. Id. at 178-79, 812 P.2d at 1326-27.
298. Id. at 178, 812 P.2d at 1326.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
301. 109 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12 (1989).
302. Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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Finally, the court found that this case represented the risk that is
inherent in permitting emotional distress claims to be brought by one
spouse against another. 05 Irrespective of the lack of merit of Mrs. Hakkila's claim, the court reasoned, Mr. Hakkila was subjected to a six-day
trial and all the other inconveniences which accompany such an endeavor1 06
Judge Donnelly, concurring specially, expressed concern for the technical
problems that arise when a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is joined to an action for the dissolution of a marriage. 3°7 He
pointed out that in situations when alimony is an issue in the dissolution
of divorce action, the alimony award and the compensatory damage
award for the infliction of emotional distress appear to overlap.30 8 Additionally, Judge Donnelly found that Mrs. Hakkila did not prove a
prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as she
did not prove that Mr. Hakkila's conduct was sufficiently outrageous,
nor did she distinguish between the emotional distress that resulted from
Mr. Hakkila's conduct and the distress that resulted from the divorce
itself. 309 Finally, Judge Donnelly expressed concern that Mrs. Hakkila did
not assert a claim of assault and battery against her husband despite the
fact that she testified that he hit her on a number of occasions. 310 Due
to all the technical problems that arise in dissolution of marriage proceedings that are joined by tort claims, Judge Donnelly suggested that
the two proceedings should be bifurcated and tried separately. 31'
Hakkila v. Hakkila recognizes that one spouse can recover money
damages if the other spouse engages in intentional or reckless conduct
that rises to the level "extreme and outrageous" in light of the marital
relationship and that conduct results in emotional distress. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals gives little guidance as to what constitutes "extreme
and outrageous" conduct in the marital context. It is clear that the
conduct must be beyond all possible bounds of decency; however, the
court found that it was not beyond the bounds of decency to lock one's
spouse out of the house at night in her robe. Neither was it beyond the
bounds of decency to throw one's spouse across a room face-first into
a pot of dirt, nor to slam a door on her head, nor continually degrade
her in public. Because the threshold of extreme and outrageous conduct
in the marital context appears to be extremely high, a prima facie case

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 180-82, 812 P.2d at 1328-30 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 182, 812 P.2d at 1330. Judge Donnelly pointed out that the trial court awarded Mrs.
Hakkila damages based on her "loss of possibility of gainful employment past, present, and future,
and medical and psychological expenses past, present, and future." Id. She was also awarded special
medical damages and damages for her loss of earnings during the marriage. Because such earnings
are presumptively community property, Judge Donnelly found that the damage award infringed on
the marital property award. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 183, 812 P.2d at 1331.
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of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the marital context will
be difficult to establish.
Additionally, the effect of the permissibility of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims in the marital context on no-fault divorce
is unknown. Conceivably, awarding money damages for the infliction of
emotional distress could become a method by which parties attempt to
recover for the misdeeds of one's spouse in a system where the degree
of a spouse's fault is not supposed to play a part in the property
distribution. Irrespective of the problems that may arise as a result of
the recognition of this tort in the marital context, New Mexico courts
have agreed to recognize it until the public policy reasons behind such
recognition are outweighed by the harm the tort might produce.
III.

LANDOWNER LIABILITY IN NEW MEXICO

Traditionally, the liability of a landowner for injury to visitors upon
his land was divided into categories depending upon the status of the
visitor.11 2 The law generally recognized distinctions between the adult and
315 As a general rule,
child trespasser, 3 ' the invitee,3 1 4 and the licensee.
the landowner owed the duty31 6 of least care to the adult trespasser and
the most care to the invitee.
In the 1950s and 1960s, courts in many jurisdictions began to abolish
317
these distinctions in favor of a general negligence standard. The overall
liability
in
premises
result of this change favored plaintiffs over landowners
31 s
other
the
in
back
In the 1980s, the national pendulum swung
cases.
traditional
the
to
direction as many courts "reaffirmed their commitment
' 31 9
trespasser-licensee-invitee classification scheme.
During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a
general negligence analysis of landowner liability for off-premises tort

312. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 386 (Sth Ed. 1984).
313. Trespassers are those who enter land without permission. Id. §§ 58-59.
314. Invitees are invited onto.the premises for purposes which will benefit the landowner (including
contractors). Id. § 61.
315. Licensees are visitors who enter with implied or express permission, solely for their own
benefit (includes social guests). Id. § 60; see generally J. PAGE, THm LAw OF PRmisES LiABmrrY
(1989).
316. The only duty owed the adult trespasser was to inform him of unreasonably dangerous
artificial conditions on the land, but only if the landowner knew or had reason to know of the
trespasser's presence. W. KEETON, supra note 312, § 58. In contrast, the landowner owed a duty
to protect invitees from dangerous artificial conditions which he knows about or should have known
about. Id. § 61. This imposes upon the landowner the additional duty of conducting reasonable
inspections. Id. Finally, landowners owed a duty to inform licensees of those unreasonably dangerous
conditions of which they were already aware, but owed no duty to inspect and find such conditions.
Id. § 60.
317. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) (maritime law);
Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (reasonable care and foreseeability
of risk determines liability).
318. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 312, at 433; J. PAGE, supra note 315, § 6.6.
319. W. KEETON, supra note 312, § 433.
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claims. 20 The court used a general negligence standard to extend a duty
to any individual injured as a proximate result of carelessness on the
part of a landowner . 2' During the same survey period, the New Mexico

Court of Appeals twice affirmed the use of traditional classification
schemes in on-premises contexts . 3 This survey article examines these
four cases: two pertaining to injuries occurring on the landowner's premises, 323 and two regarding injuries occurring off the landowner's prem24
ises. 3

A.

On-Premises Liability: Landowner's Duty to Provide Reasonably
Safe Conditions for Business Invitees
New Mexico law assigns a duty to landowners to provide a reasonably

safe place for business invitees to work. 325 This duty requires that the

landowner exercise reasonable care to discover and protect invitees from
dangerous artificial conditions of which the landowner is or should be
aware. 32 The duty includes conducting reasonable inspections to find
unreasonably dangerous conditions. 327 It also includes making reasonable
repairs or warning invitees of the presence of an unsafe condition.3 2

Finally, although most claims are against landowners, the analysis as to
liability should be the same whether the claim is against the landowner
or against another in possession of the land, such as a contractor, lessor,
329
or employer.
1. Requarth v. Brophy
" ' the court of appeals
In Requarth v. Brophy330 and Davis v. Gabriel,33
adhered to traditional principles of common law by assigning duty in
320. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990) (assigned liability to a landlord
for injury occurring off the property); Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 808 P.2d
614 (1991) (assigned liability to landowner for off-premises injury to a general passerby).
321. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990) (assigned liability to a landlord
for injury occurring off the property); Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, Ill N.M. 644, 808 P.2d
614 (1991) (assigned liability to landowner for off-premises injury to a general passerby).
322. Requarth v. Brophy, 111 N.M. 51, 801 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1990); Davis v. Gabriel, 111
N.M. 289, 804 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1990).
323. See supra note 322. Since the survey period covered by this issue ended, the supreme court
affirmed the court of appeals' treatment of premises liability, and in some respects even extended
it. See Klopp v. Wackenhut, 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992), discussed infra, note 370, Saiz
v. Belen School Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), discussed infra, note 343. The court
of appeals also continued to broaden landowner liability in Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822
P.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1991), discussed infra, note 343.
324. See supra note 320.
325. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Mozert v. Noedig, 76 N.M. 396, 400, 415 P.2d 364, 368 (1966)); see also Koenig v. Perez, 104
N.M. 664, 726 P.2d 341 (1986); Padilla v. Winsor, 67 N.M. 267, 354 P.2d 740 (1960); Thompson
v. Dale, 59 N.M. 290, 283 P.2d 623 (1955).
326. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Mozert v. Noedig, 76 N.M. 396, 400, 415 P.2d 364, 368 (1966)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc. 103 N.M. 689, 694, 712 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1985); Fresquez v.
Southwestern Industrial Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 89 N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976).
330. 111 N.M. 51, 801 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1990).
331. I1 N.M. 289, 804 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1990).
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terms of the injured invitee's relationship with the landowner. In Requarth,
defendant Brophy was an independent contractor doing business as Handcrafted Homes 3 2 Brophy contracted to construct the Lockes' home on
land that the Lockes owned.33 The contract between Brophy and the
Lockes gave Brophy exclusive supervisory authority over all work and
workers, including any subcontractors Brophy chose to hire."34 Brophy
was injured on the site
employed plaintiff Robert Requarth. 35 Requarth
36
when he stepped on some loose planks. 1
Requarth sued Brophy and the Lockes. 337 Count two of his claim
against the Lockes was based on the theory that, as homeowners, they
negligently failed to maintain a reasonably safe environment for business
invitees.338 The Lockes denied this allegation during argument in support
of their motion for summary judgment by pointing to the contract, in
which they relinquished control over all work to Brophy, as well as
providing factual evidence to this effect.3 39 This count, dismissed
by the
34
court on summary judgment, was the subject of the appeal. 0
The issue in this case involved whether landowners should be liable
for the protection of employees of independent contractors.3 4' The question
of extending a landowner's liability in such a manner had never been
squarely addressed in New Mexico. 342 The court of appeals held that
landowners should be liable, but limited liability to those cases in which
the landowner had sufficient control of the property at the time of the

accident .

343

332. Requarth, 111 N.M. at 52, 801 P.2d at 122.
333. Id. at 53, 801 P.2d at 123.
334. Id. The contract provided that Brophy obtain workers' compensation insurance, and that
the Lockes furnish a builder's risk policy insuring Brophy. Id.
335. 'Id.
336. Id. at 52, 801 P.2d at 122.
337. Id. at 53, 801 P.2d at 123. Requarth's claim against Brophy was based only on workers'
compensation benefits, and was not an issue on appeal. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. Earlier cases only held landowners liable for providing reasonably safe premises to
independent contractors, as employees.
342. Id. (citing from Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985) (duty of
independent contractor to employees "is not absolute")).
The issue has tangentially come before the court. The extension of duty to employees of an
independent contractor arose but was not squarely answered in Fresquez v. Southwestern Indus.
Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 89 N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558
P.2d 620 (1976) ("employer has a duty to provide employees with a reasonably safe workplace").
See also Arenivas v. Continental Oil Co., 102 N.M. 106, 692 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed,
102 N.M. 88, 691 P.2d 881 (1984) (general independent contractors are liable for providing employees
with a safe workplace); Mozert v. Noeding, 76 N.M. 396, 415 P.2d 364 (1966) (landowner has
duty to protect invitees from harms he knows about).
343. Requarth, 111 N.M. at 54, 801 P.2d at 124. In Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d
677 (Ct. App. 1991), decided after the survey period covered by this issue, the court of appeals
found that the owner of property "has a nondelegable duty to maintain safely those areas over
which he has retained control." Id. at 40, 822 P.2d at 679. The court adopted the rationale of a
Michigan court which reasoned that "this duty [to keep the premises safe] cannot be avoided by
hiring an independent contractor to make repairs," and thus imposed vicarious liability on the
landowner. Id. (citing Misiulis v. Milbrand Maintenance Corp., 52 Mich. App. 494, 218 N.W.2d
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The court of appeals drew several important conclusions in deciding
the case. First, it defined independent contractors as invitees2 4 Next,
the court applied the traditional principles of duty owed to invitees to
employees of invitees as well. 3 45 In so doing, it adopted section 343 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability on the landowner who fails to exercise reasonable care in protecting invitees from
dangerous conditions on the landowner's property.?
Section 343 requires three specific findings in order to assign liability.47
First, the landowner must know or should know about the condition.1
He must exercise reasonable care to inform himself of conditions upon
34
his land, and must realize when they are likely to endanger invitees. 1
Second, the landowner must expect that invitees will fail to discover the
349
condition or will be unable to protect themselves from it.
Finally, in
addition to meeting the first and second requirements, the landowner
must fail to take reasonable actions to protect invitees from the con-

dition .350
After recognizing that a duty to subcontractors' employees existed in
this context, the Requarth court concluded that the scope of the duty
should vary "according to the degree of control exercised by the owner
over the premises, the details of the work being performed, and the
extent to which the landowner knows or should expect that an invitee
will not discover or realize such danger." 35 ' Because Requarth failed to
provide any evidence that the Lockes, as homeowners, had any control
over the premises or over the work being done other than the general
control of a property owner, the court of appeals held that the lower
35 2
court's summary judgment was proper.
68 (1974)). Broome adopted

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

sections 420 and 422, which both

define exceptions to the general rule that an employer is generally not vicariously liable for the
negligence of independent contractors whom he hires. Broome, 113 N.M. at 41, 822 P.2d at 680.
In Saiz v. Belen School District, 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), also decided after the survey
period covered by this issue, the supreme court held that the landowner who employs independent
contractors to do work which "as a matter of law [he] should recognize as likely to create a peculiar
risk of physical harm to others unless reasonable precautions are taken is liable for physical harm
to others caused by an absence of those precautions." Id. This rule imposes strict, not vicarious,
liability upon the landowner via a nondelegable duty to take all reasonable precautions against
peculiar risks which can present a special danger to others. In Saiz, the risk of high voltage electrical
shock presented such a danger to high school students at football games because the school district's
contractors failed to take all the reasonable precautions when installing the stadium lighting system.

Id.
344. Requarth, Ill N.M. at 54, 801 P.2d at 124.
345. Id.
346. Id. This adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS comports with prior New Mexico
cases. See, e.g., Mozert v. Noeding, 76 N.M. 396, 415 P.2d 364 (1966).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(a) (1965).
348. Id.
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(b) (1965).
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(c) (1965).
351. Requarth, Ill N.M. at 54, 801 P.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
352. Id. at 55, 801 P.2d at 125. In contrast, Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677 (Ct.
App. 1991), involved a landowner who retained control over his building while his independent
contractor made repairs. Although the owner did not control the work being done, the fact that
he did retain control of the building and continued to operate his business while repairs were going
on, was basis enough for liability. Id.See discussion of Broome supra note 343.
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Requarth extended protection of invitees to employees of independent
contractors as well as to those explicitly invited onto the property. Although the court had considered that issue before, this was the first time
it reached a definitive conclusion on the matter.35 3 Requarth holds that

a claim against a landowner for the landowner's own negligence will only
be successful to the extent that he was actually in control of the premises
and activity on the land at that time.3 1
2. Davis v. Gabriel
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the liability of a contractor
to an injured business invitee in Davis v. Gabriel.355 Davis, employed by
Los Alamos National Laboratories, 35 6 was injured when he tripped over
debris left outside his office by a construction contractor whom the
laboratories had hired to do remodeling.3 7 Davis originally intended to
sue the contractor for personal injuries. 5 8 After discovering that the
statute of limitations had run on the negligence claim, Davis brought
this suit against his attorney, Gabriel.3 59 In order to decide the legal
malpractice issue, the court of appeals had to address whether Davis'

original cause of action for negligence was meritorious.3w
The original claim asserted that the contractor, acting on behalf of
the possessor of land, should be liable for failing to protect invitees from
obvious dangers posed by conditions on the premises. 36' The district court
granted summary judgment for Gabriel on the grounds that Davis' knowl-

353. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
354. Requarth, II1 N.M. at 54, 801 P.2d at 124. Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677
(Ct. App. 1991), defines landowner negligence even more broadly than Requarth because the duty
imposed upon landowners is nondelegable. Thus, a landowner is not only liable for his own negligence,
but also for that of his independent contractors. See supra note 343. Saiz v. Belen School District,
113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), goes even further than Broome. Not only does it impose a
nondelegable duty upon landowners to take precautions against injuries resulting from conditions
which present a peculiar risk of harm on their property, but it finds landowners who breach this
duty strictly liable. This means that under the right set of circumstances, whether the landowner's
contractors were negligent does not even matter for purposes of assigning liability to the landowner.
See supra note 343.
355. 111 N.M. 289, 804 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1990). The court assessed liability to the contractor
rather than the landowner in this case on the grounds that, in acting on behalf of the landowner,
the contractor acquired the requisite amount of control. Id.; see also Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103
N.M. 689, 695, 712 P.2d 1351, 1357 (1985) (a visitor who creates any condition on the land is
subject to the same liability as the landowner); cf. Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677
(Ct. App. 1991); Saiz v. Belen School Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992).
356. Davis, IlI N.M. at 290, 804 P.2d at 1109. Based upon his employment by Los Alamos
National Laboratories, the court classified Davis as a "business invitee." Id. at 291, 804 P.2d at
1110; see N.M. U.J.l. Ciw. 13-1303 (defining "business invitee").
357. Davis, Ill N.M. at 290, 804 P.2d at 1109.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 291, 804 P.2d at 1110. The court recognized that the contractor, acting 6n behalf
of Los Alamos National Laboratories, owed the same duties to invitees as the Laboratories owed.
Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 384 (1965); see also Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M.
689, 695-96, 712 P.2d 1351, 1357-58 (1985) (adopting section 384 as the law in New Mexico).
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edge of the risk posed by construction in his office hallway would prevent
him from recovering from the contractor. 62
The issue examined by the court of appeals was whether a possessor
of land (here the contractor) who is aware of a dangerous condition on
his land should be liable for injuries resulting from the condition even
when it is obviously dangerous, or when the landowner or possessor can
prove that the invitee was aware of the condition.3 63 The court of appeals
reversed the district court's holding, concluding that Davis' knowledge
of an apparently3 obvious risk was not necessarily a bar to recovery against
the contractor. 6
The court held that when obvious dangers exist on the land, a jury
might find a breach of duty if the landowner or possessor: 1) should
have recognized that invitees acting carefully in light of the dangerous
condition could still be injured; and 2) failed to take precautions despite
the high risk which the dangerous condition presented. 36 These two
requirements derive directly from section 343A of the Restatement (Sec3
ond) of Torts. 66
Because the court of appeals was only concerned with the trial court's
denial of Davis' summary judgment motion, it made no conclusions on
the issue of breach, which it remanded for determination by the trial
court. On remand, the question of whether a breach occurred, the court
posited, should center on whether the risk was so great that the contractor
should have taken precautions. 367 This analysis should involve balancing
factors such as "the expense of the precaution, the probability of harm,
and the probable extent of harm. ' 36 The degree of dangerousness and
cost of fixing the condition both enter into the breach inquiry.
The import of this case for the practitioner is twofold. First, the
landowner or one in possession must realize that the invitee's awareness
of a risky condition alone will not protect the landowner from liability
for injuries that might result from that condition. As a matter of law,
a landowner still has a duty to protect invitees from dangerous conditions.
Second, the breach analysis is dependent upon the facts of each particular
case. When an invitee is injured due to a dangerous condition on the

362. Davis, Ill N.M. at 292, 804 P.2d at 1111. Assumption of the risk by an invitee is not
usually a defense for a landowner's liability. See W. KEETON, supra note 312, at 442.
363. Davis, Il1 N.M. at 292, 804 P.2d at 1111; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343A(l)
(1965).
364. Davis, 111 N.M. at 292, 804 P.2d at 1111.
365. Id. The type of danger is not peculiar or risky enough in nature to be governed by Saiz,
which applies only to those peculiar dangers which are "not a normal, routine matter of customary
human activity," and which are "different from one to which persons commonly are subjected by
ordinary forms of negligence." Saiz v. Belen School Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 390, 827 P.2d 102, 105
(1992); see also supra note 343.
366. Davis, Ill N.M. at 292, 804 P.2d at 1111.
367. Id.
368. Id.; see Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 111.2d 132, 136, 554 N.E.2d 223, 226-27 (1990). In
Davis, the court makes no suggestion that the contractor violated a duty to Davis, but simply
emphasizes that the fact Davis knew of an obvious danger should not preclude him from recovery.
Davis, 111 N.M. at 292, 804 P.2d at 1111.
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defendant's land, the parties should address the jury with arguments
centering on factors such as the dangerousness and blatancy of the
particular condition, and upon the cost of fixing it. While knowledge
or obviousness of the risk could be indicative of the openly dangerous
nature of the condition on the land, and could thereby help the jury in
deciding whether a breach occurred, knowledge is not a proper defense
to liability. 69 If a court finds that the cost of an injury which could
the area safe, it may
foreseeably occur outweighs the cost of 3making
70
find the contractor liable for that injury.
Liability of Landowner for Injuries Occurring to Plaintiffs Off
their Premises
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving
71
duties of landowners to persons injured off the landowners' premises.1
Both of these cases help determine when and to what extent a landowner's
3 72
duty to keep his land safe reaches beyond his property lines.

B.

1. Calkins v. Cox Estates
Calkins v. Cox Estates,3 73 was a wrongful death action on behalf of
eight-year-old Daniel Enriquez.3 74 Enriquez lived with his grandparents in
the apartment complex owned by Cox Estates. 37 While playing in the
apartment's playground area with a friend one day, Enriquez wandered
through a hole in the playground fence, across an arroyo, and onto the
Pan American Freeway, a frontage road to the interstate located about

369. When the dangers on his property are so openly and obviously dangerous that invitees are
aware of them, although they exercise due care, the landowner probably has a duty to protect the
invitee if he believes that harm may occur despite the invitee's knowledge of the risk. Davis, 111
N.M. at 291, 804 P.2d 1110; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l) (1965); see also
discussion of Saiz v. Belen School Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), supra notes 343,
365.
370. Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992), decided after the survey
period covered by this issue, presents a significant change in the law since Davis. The New Mexico
Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the inferences that practitioners had drawn from Davis.
Id. It explicitly refuted the inference that the landowner might be able to satisfy its duty to avoid
an unreasonable risk of injury to others with a mere warning. Id. Furthermore, the court held that
"in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of the premises owes a duty to safeguard each
business visitor whom the occupier reasonably may foresee could be injured by a danger avoidable
through reasonable precautions available to the occupier of the premises." Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at
297. Klopp appealed a verdict directed against her by the lower court. Id. at 153, 824 P.2d at 293.
The issue presented on appeal was whether the airport should be liable for Klopp's injury, sustained
when she tripped over the base of a metal detector located at an airport security station, or was
the situation was so open and obvious that the airport should owe no duty to Klopp, and therefore
the lower court properly directed its verdict against her. Id. at 153-54, 824 P.2d at 293-94.
371. Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990); Bober v. New Mexico State Fair,
11l N.M. 644, 808 P.2d 614 (1991).
372. Bober was decided last term, and is thus within this survey period. Calkins, on the other
hand, was decided prior to the survey period but is treated here due to its great significance in
developing the law of premises liability in New Mexico.
373. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990).
374. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
375. Id.
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945 feet from the apartment complex.3 76 He was killed by an automobile
77
traveling on the frontage road.
The district court granted Cox Estates' motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the apartment landlord had no duty to maintain the
fence located on the premises.3 78 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court on different grounds, reasoning that the landlord simply owed no duty to the child in this case.3 79 The New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.38°
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether "a
lessor owes a duty of care to his tenants to maintain the common areas
of the leased premises-in this case a playground adjacent to an area
leading to a highway-in a reasonably safe condition." 3 ' In addressing
this issue, the court clarified principles pertaining to duty and scope of
duty, and remanded the case to the district court for determinations on
proximate cause and breach. 8 2 The New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the landlord's duty was "to maintain the common areas of his
property in a safe condition, as a reasonably prudent person would under
the circumstances. "383 The foreseeability of the injury to Enriquez, not
the boundaries of the property, should determine the scope of the landlord's duty. 3 4 As breach is a finding of fact for the jury, the supreme
court did not resolve that issue.38 s Instead, the court instructed the trial
court to present two factual issues to the jury: 1) whether the landlord
breached his duty; and 2) whether Enriquez's injury was a foreseeable
result of the breach. 3 6 If Enriquez's injury was proximately caused by
the landlord's failure to exercise 3his duties, then the jury should conclude
that a breach of duty occurred. 8
The New Mexico Supreme Court first addressed whether the landlord
in this case owed a general duty to a tenant injured off the landlord's
premises. The court considered three possible sources for such a duty:
1) the duty imposed by statutory law upon the landlord-tenant relationship; 388 2) principles established at common law for the landlord and

376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
382. Id. at 66, 792 P.2d at 43.
383. Id. at 64-65, 792 P.2d at 41-42.
384. Id. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42.
385. Id. at 66, 792 P.2d at 43.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 65 n.6, 792 P.2 at 42 n.6. Proximate cause involves analyses of foreseeability and
scope of duty, discussed infra inotes 392-96 and accompanying text.
388. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40. The relevant statute requires that landowners
"keep common areas of the premises in a safe condition." Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-820(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1989)). The statute does not "affirmative[ly] obligate [the landowner] to
inspect or maintain areas over which control has been relinquished," but only states that the
landowner "is responsible for maintaining, in a reasonably safe condition, areas that expressly or
impliedly are reserved for the common use of some or all of his tenants." Id.
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tenant;3 8 9 and 3) a "general negligence standard of care and determination
of duty" to all persons. 319 The court found that statutes and common
law imposed a duty upon the landlord to maintain common areas of the
premises in a reasonably safe condition.3 9'
Next, the supreme court addressed whether Cox Estates owed a duty
to Enriquez.3 92 Whether the duty was owed to Enriquez was a question
of whether the injury was foreseeable to Enriquez from Cox Estates'
breach of duty. 93 The supreme court emphasized that the geographic
location of the injury should not determine whether a duty was owed
to the injured person. a94 Rather, the question centered on whether the
plaintiff was within the foreseeable "zone of danger created by [Cox
Estates'] actions. ' 395 The court concluded that Enriquez was a foreseeable
plaintiff because, as an individual, he was personally located
within the
39
zone of harm created by Cox Estates' careless activity.
Having established that Enriquez, as a foreseeable plaintiff, was owed
a duty of care by Cox Estates, the court next examined the scope of
that duty. The court held that the scope should be analyzed in terms

39
of whether the injury was proximately caused by the landlord's actions. 7
Thus, Cox Estates was liable if failure to fix the hole in the fence was
the proximate cause of Enriquez's death. 39 The fact that the injury
occurred 945 feet away from the premises could be a factor in determining
3 99
whether the injury was a proximate result of the landlord's actions.

389. Id.; see Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540 (1936); Torres v. Piggly Wiggly Shop
Rite Foods, Inc., 93 N.M. 408, 600 P.2d 1198 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d
821 (1979).
390. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40. "New Mexico law recognizes that there exists a
duty assigned to all individuals requiring them to act reasonably under the circumstances according
to the standard of conduct imposed upon them by the circumstances." Id.
391. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1989). The court defined the
apartment's playground as an area reserved for common use by tenants. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 63,
792 P.2d at 40. While the court acknowledged the existence and legitimacy of a general negligence
standard as the basis for a duty in many instances, it declined to frame Cox Estates' duty to
Enriquez in such broad terms. Id. Calkins' complaint alleged the existence of a duty based upon
general principles of negligence. Since other bases for a duty were present here, the court found
it unnecessary to balance factors in order to recognize a duty as a matter of policy. Id. The
determination of duty based upon principles of negligence is a policy decision, and is based on the
premise that, upon looking at the factors in a given case, it is only fair to give the plaintiff some
means of recourse for defendant's actions. Id.; see also W. KEETON, supra note 312.
392. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 64, 792 P.2d at 41.
395. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
396. Id. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42. The court relied upon Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) and Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983)
(foreseeability of the plaintiff answers the question of whom a duty is owed to. Foreseeability of
the injury is a determination of proximate cause, and also answers the question of whether the
defendant breached his duty). Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62, 66, 792 P.2d at 39, 43.
397. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 64 n.5, 792 P.2d at 42 n.5. "Once a duty is established, either by
reference to statutory or common law duties or by reference to the general negligence standard,
the question of the scope of that duty is a question of proximate cause." Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 65 n.6, 792 P.2d at 42 n.6. It would be possible for a jury to find a breach by Cox
Estates, but to decide that Enriquez's injuries were too far removed from the breach to have been
proximately caused by it.
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What the court cautioned against was a finding that, as a matter of
law, Cox Estates could not be liable to Enriquez because his injury
occurred off the premises.0
The New Mexico Supreme Court then remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether Cox Estates breached its duty of
due care to Enriquez and whether injury to Enriquez was proximately
caused by Cox Estates' failure to maintain the playground fence. 40 1 The
court identified several relevant issues for consideration on remand. One
was the foreseeability that children like Enriquez would crawl through
the fence and follow a travel route similar to that taken by him."42 The
distance traveled before Enriquez was killed was another. 4 3 Also, the
jury might determine that an intervening act could have caused Enriquez's
actual death.4 Finally, the jury might consider the difficulty and cost
of repairing the fence as compared to the seriousness and likelihood of
the harm that could, and did, result.*
Justice Ransom dissented in this case. His dissent focused on the fact
that the remote nature of Enriquez's injury should preclude liability as
a matter of law.4 His rationale was based upon the policy consideration
that it is unfair to impose liability on a defendant when a case presents
a sufficiently "remote" injury.0 Thus, "a duty to avoid that which may
be remote as a matter of public policy" should not be imposed upon
anyone.408
2. Bober v. New Mexico State Fair
In Bober v. New Mexico State Fair,4" the New Mexico Supreme Court
relied upon the general negligence standard of care that was recognized
in dicta in Calkins.410 Tingley Coliseum, located on the New Mexico State

400. Id. at 64, 792 P.2d at 41. "The fact that [plaintiff's] injury occurred beyond the boundaries
of the leased premises may well be relevant in determining whether the Landlord acted reasonably,
but it does not compel the conclusion that the Landlord owed [plaintiff) no duty of care in the
first place." Id. (quoting Udy v. Calvary Corp., 162 Ariz. 7, 12, 780 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Ct. App.
1989)). The duty of care in maintaining common areas "should be determined not with reference
to geographical boundaries, but with reference to the foreseeability of injury." Id. at 65, 792 P.2d
at 42.
401. Id. at 66, 792 P.2d at 43.
402. Id. at 65 n.6, 792 P.2d at 42 n.6.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42. The court also suggested that the jury might want to consider
that the open and obvious nature of the hole in the fence may raise questions of whether Enriquez
(or his grandparents) should have been comparatively liable for playing in an unsafe area. Id. at
66 n.7, 792 P.2d at 42 n.7.
406. Id. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
407. Id.
408. Id. In Klopp v. Wackenhut, 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992), decided since the period
covered by this survey issue, Justice Ransom referred to the Calkins decision as support for the
court's holding that a ruling on whether a dangerous condition presented an unreasonable risk is
a jury question, and in dicta cited the Calkins holding that a landowner is generally liable for all
foreseeable injuries to a plaintiff. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 156, 824 P.2d at 295; see supra note 370.
409. 111 N.M. 644, 808 P.2d 614 (1991).
410. This general standard established a duty of property owners to all landowners (not just
landlords) for injuries to the general public.
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Fairgrounds, is often the site of rock concerts. 41 1 Shawn Granthan attended
one such concert on October 26, 1985.42 Like many patrons, he parked
in the State Fairgrounds' infield lot, located adjacent to Tingley Coliseum
and just off the racetrack. 413 A dirt access road led from the infield to
Louisiana Boulevard. 4 4 After the concert, Granthan attempted to turn
left from this road onto Louisiana Boulevard, and in so doing struck
Ingrid Bober's car and seriously injured her. 41 5 Bober filed a personal
injury claim against Granthan, the State Fair and State Fair Commission,
the State Police, the City of Albuquerque,
and Feyline, the concert
41 6
promoter, alleging negligence against each.
The State Fair and the State Police each filed motions for summary
judgment, arguing that they owed Bober no duty, and stated that even
if they did owe a duty, they would be immune from liability under the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 41 7 The district court granted summary
judgment for both of the defendants. 41 8 Bober appealed. 41 9 On appeal,
the New Mexico Supreme Court primarily considered the summary judgment granted to the State Fair. 420 The court's determination of whether
summary judgment was properly granted by the district court necessitated
its consideration of two issues: 1) whether the State Fair owed a duty
to Bober although she was injured merely while passing by the fairgrounds; 42' and 2) whether the State Fair should be entitled to immunity
under the applicable sections of the Tort Claims Act. 422 The court reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that the
423
State Fair did owe a general duty of care to those passing by its property.
The court also held that the State Fair could not invoke the Tort Claims
Act as a defense because sections of the Act that waive the424 immunity
of generally protected public employees applied in this case.
a. Summary Judgment Issue #1:
Duty Owed to Bober by the State Fair
The New Mexico Supreme Court broadly declared that as a landowner,
the State Fair owes a general duty of care towards all persons whom
their actions might affect, including passersby such as Ingrid Bober. 425

411. Bober, I11 N.M. at 646, 808 P.2d at 616.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
418. Bober, 111 N.M. at 646, 808 P.2d at 616.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 647, 808 P.2d at 617. Because Bober's appellate briefs made "scant reference" to
the State Police, the court's treatment of their liability is brief. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 648, 808 P.2d at 618.
424. Id. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622.
425. Id. at 648, 808 P.2d at 618.
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The court relied in part upon a prior New Mexico case, Mitchell v. C
& H Transportation Co., 42 in recognizing this duty. 427 The general care
standard applied by the court in Bober, however, did not arise from a
statute or regulation such as the one in Mitchell,42' nor from any traditionally recognized relationship by which duty has been derived.4 29
Rather, the court broadly stated that "[e]very person has a duty to
exercise ordinary care for the safety of the person and the property of
its conduct, breached this duty,
others.' '430 Whether the State Fair, in
43
was a question for a jury to decide. '
The court next addressed the scope of the State Fair's duty. 4 2 The
court held that the property owner should owe a duty for all foreseeable
harms caused by hazards on the property. 433 To clarify its ruling, the
court explained that the scope of the duty owed is not dependent upon
whether the injury occurred on or off the premises. 43 Quoting from
Calkins, the court held that "the location of the accident is not relevant
to the question of duty."' 435 The court held, as in Calkins, that once a
determination has been made that a duty is owed, "the foreseeability of
harm governs the scope of that duty. ' 436 Furthermore, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that determining whether a duty is owed is not
dependent upon the nature of the owner's property interest. 437 The duty
is the same regardless of whether the defendant is a landowner or lessor. 438
In addition, the existence of a duty is not dependent upon any existing
"collateral duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition. ' 439 More-

426. 90 N.M. 471, 565 P.2d 342 (1977).
427. Id. Mitchell held that an owner or occupier of property owes a duty to those traveling on
the streets adjacent to it to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Mitchell, 90 N.M. at 473,
565 P.2d at 344.
428. Bober, 111 N.M. at 647, 808 P.2d at 617. The regulation relied upon in Mitchell provided
that owners of property located along highways maintain adjoining driveways in a safe condition.
Mitchell, 90 N.M. at 473, 565 P.2d at 344.
429. Bober, 111 N.M. at 648, 808 P.2d at 618. For example, Bober was not an invitee, licensee,
or trespasser. Id. The opinion listed a number of other relational bases for which such a duty may
be derived: property interests, statute, lease or other contract, identity as a visitor on another's
land, or even being a "mere" passerby, as was the case here. Id.
430. Id. (quoting N.M. U.J.I. Crv. § 13-604).
431. Id. The determination of whether the state fair breached its duty was based on whether the
state fair's conduct was sufficient to ensure Bober's safety, given all the circumstances. Id. The
opinion cited a number of actions which the state fair could have taken to make the situation safe,
including providing traffic controls such as safety cones, "no left turn" signs, and/or traffic directors
to force drivers to turn right rather than left onto Louisiana. Id.
432. Id. at 649, 808 P.2d at 619. The court employed the same analysis as it used in Calkins
v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990).
433. Id. at 649, 808 P.2d at 619.
434. Id.
435. Id. (quoting Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990)).
436. Id. (quoting Bach v. State, 152 Ariz. 145, 730 P.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1986)).
437. Id. at 648, 808 P.2d at 618.
438. Id.
439. Id. It is not necessary for such a duty to have been created by statute, regulation, or contract
provision. See Calkins, 110 N.M. at 64, 792 P.2d at 41 (landowner does not owe duty to a tenant
by law, but when landowner undertakes duty, he is obligated to do so in reasonably safe manner);
Mitchell v. C & H Transportation Co., 90 N.M. at 476, 565 P.2d at 347 (aside from rules or
regulations, landowner owes duty to the public once he has undertaken to maintain the property).
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over, duty is not defined by the identity of the injured party in relation
to the landowner. 44 Finally, conduct should not be used to determine
whether a landowner owes a duty to the injured party."' Hence, a
landowner owes a general duty to individuals who foreseeably may be
harmed by the landowner's conduct regardless of whether a relationship
2
exists, or whether the person is injured on or off the premises.4
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained that the determination that a duty exists should not depend upon the nature of the
defendant's conduct. Bober argued that the State Fair failed to take
precautions that would have prevented her accident with Granthan from
occurring.44" The court rejected her argument, stating that "duty" should
not be defined in terms of specific details of conduct that must be
fulfilled. 4" Duty is determined by whether the defendant should be under
an obligation to a particular plaintiff for harms that could foreseeably
occur." 5' If so, "the duty remains constant, while the conduct necessary
to fulfill it varies with the circumstances.' '4 The court relied upon Coburn
v. City of Tucson," 7 which stated that:
[a]ttempting to define or evaluate conduct in terms of duty tends to
rigidify the concept of negligence-a concept which, by definition,
must vary from case to case, depending upon the relationship of the
parties and the facts of each case. 4"
The court established that the State Fair owed a general duty to Bober
to "exercise ordinary care to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of
harm." 4 9 The proper purpose of an inquiry into the defendant's conduct
in a negligence case is to determine whether the duty owed to the injured
party was breached .450 Conduct will always include different specific acts
or failures to act, and the specific conduct necessary to fulfill a duty
will vary depending upon the circumstances of each individual case. 45'

440. Bober, Ill N.M. at 648, 808 P.2d at 618. This ruling by the court downplays the importance
of "categories" of victims (invitee, licensee and trespasser) that New Mexico has traditionally used
in determining the nature and scope of duty in premises liability cases. The court, in a footnote,
addressed the difficulty in applying duty according to these categories and mentioned the fact that
some courts have adopted general negligence principles instead of categories. Id. at 648 n.5, 808
P.2d at 619 n.5; see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
The court in Bober, however, did not address whether New Mexico intends to reject such categories
in the future or simply to refrain from relying solely upon them in assessing duty. Whether general
negligence will be limited to those off-premises cases in which no category exists, or applied in lieu
of categorical definitions of duty in on-premises liability cases, remains to be seen.
441. Bober, 111 N.M. at 649, 808 P.2d at 619.
442. Id.
443. Id. Bober argued that the State Fair may have met its duty by putting up "no left turn"
signs at the Louisiana Boulevard exit, by hiring traffic control officers to prohibit people from
turning left, or by taking other similar actions to make the exit safe. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. (quoting Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984) (en banc)).
446. Id. (quoting Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984) (en banc)).
447. 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984).
448. Id. at 52, 691 P.2d at 1080.
449. Bober, 111 N.M. at 646, 808 P.2d at 616.
450. Id. at 650, 808 P.2d at 620.
451. Id. at 649, 808 P.2d at 619.
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The State Fair had a duty to exercise ordinary care. 4 2 The determination
of whether the State Fair exercised ordinary care or reasonable conduct
under the circumstances was a question for a jury to decide.453
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the State Fair because it concluded that the State Fair did not meet its
burden of proving that no genuine issue existed regarding whether it
"exercised ordinary care in guarding against the dangerous [traffic] situation. ' 45 4 The State Fair might have won summary judgment on this
issue had it shown that its conduct: 1) "did not give rise to an unreasonable
risk of harm to the traveling public . . . -411 and 2) "was what an
ordinary person would have done under the same [set of] circum-

stances."14-16

b. Summary Judgment Issue #2:
Immunity of the State Fair Under the Tort Claims Act
The issue of whether the State Fair exercised ordinary care was only
one of the court's reasons for reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. The State Fair asserted two affirmative defenses to support
its summary judgment motions. First, it argued that it had contractually
delegated its duties to Feyline, the concert promoter, and was thus immune
from liability. 45 7 Second, it contended that it was governmentally immune
from liability under the Tort Claims Act. 458 The court rejected the State
Fair's delegation argument due to ambiguities in the release agreement
and because the State Fair's reservation of control over the property
obligated it "to guard against any unsafe condition.' 459 The court also
held that the State Fair should not be immune from liability and reversed
the summary judgment on that basis as well.4
(1) No Delegation of Duties to Feyline by the State Fair
The court wholly rejected the State Fair's argument that it delegated
its duties to Feyline in the parties' lease agreement.4' The lease agreement
One
provided that Feyline could use Tingley Coliseum for its concert.
pertinent provision of the agreement read:

452. Id. at 650, 808 P.2d at 620.
453. Id. The judge sets the rules by defining what duty is and to whom it shall apply, and the
jury then answers the specific question of whether it has been breached in a particular case. The
court emphasized that this allocation of questions between judge and jury is a fundamental aspect
of negligence cases such as this one. Id.
454. Id. at 651, 808 P.2d at 621.
455. Id.
456. id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622.
460. Id. at 653, 808 P.2d at 623.
461. Id.at 651, 808 P.2d at 621.
462. Id.Feyline is the concert promoter also named as a defendant in this suit.
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The Lessee hereby assumes full responsibility for the character, acts
and conduct of all persons admitted to said premises, or to any
portion of said building by the consent of the said Lessee, . . . and
said Lessee agrees to have on hand at all times sufficient police force
to maintain order and protect persons and property. 463

The State Fair claimed that in signing this agreement, it relinquished
its control of the premises to Feyline. 4 " Consequently, the State Fair
argued that Feyline was responsible for traffic control to and from the

concert.4"
The court gave several reasons why the contract did not sufficiently
delegate the State Fair's responsibilities to Feyline. First, the contract
was ambiguous because it did not specify whether the parking facilities
or merely the Coliseum should be included under the agreement. 4 Because
the district court did not make a ruling on what the contract should
cover as a matter of law, the supreme court held that the question was
factual and should be properly decided by a jury."67
Second, a provision in the contract retained the State Fair's right to
enter at any time, for any purpose." The supreme court held that when
a landowner reserves "the right to enter the leased premises to make
repairs, [he] remains responsible to make inspections and any necessary
repairs and to guard against any unsafe condition.""69 Thus, in contracting
for a right to re-enter the premises while it was leased to Feyline, the
State Fair remained obligated to "guard 470against any unsafe condition"
that it might or should reasonably find.
Finally, the court held the State Fair responsible for knowing of the
unreasonable risk the dangerous parking conditions would present to

patrons. 47 ' The State Fair failed in its attempt to sustain a grant of
summary judgment because it could not prove that it did not know of

unreasonable risks nor that it took sufficient precautions to make the

conditions safe. 472 For all of these reasons, the State Fair was unsuccessful
in delegating its responsibility to Feyline.

463. Id.
464. Id. Requarth v. Brophy, Ill N.M. 51, 801 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1990), held that a possessor
of land does not automatically relinquish liability for injuries when he contractually relinquishes
control of property to others. See supra notes 330-54 and accompanying text.
465. Bober, Ill N.M. at 651, 808 P.2d at 621.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. In a supplemental agreement, the State Fair also reserved the right to hire additional
security guards if it decided they were necessary. Id. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622.
469. Id. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622 (citing Mitchell v. C & H Transportation Co., Inc., 90 N.M.
at 474, 565 P.2d at 345 (1977)).
470. Id.; see Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1992), and discussion, supra
note 343. The Broome court held that the landowner retains a nondelegable duty to maintain safely
all areas over which he retains control. Id. at 40, 822 P.2d at 679.
471. Bober, 111 N.M. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 379A
(1965).
472. Bober, 111 N.M. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622. In Klopp v. Wackenhut, 113 N.M. 153, 824
P.2d 293 (1992), the supreme court held that, whenever the landowner should know of unreasonable
risks, even if they are open and obvious, the court will impose a nondelegable duty not merely to
warn, but to maintain the areas in a safe condition. Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
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(2) No Immunity From Liability Under
the Tort Claims Act for the State Fair
The State Fair also attempted to invoke the Tort Claims Act as a
defense, claiming itself immune as a protected public employee. 473 The
court, after review of the applicable sections of the Tort Claims Act,
concluded that sections of the Act that waive the immunity of generally
474
protected public employees, such as the State Fair, applied in this case.
The court based its holding on Castillo v. County of Santa Fe,475 in
which section 41-4-6 of the Tort Claims Act was found to waive immunity
from liability whenever "due to the alleged negligence of public employees
an injury arises from an unsafe, dangerous, or defective condition on
property owned and operated by the government .... "476 The New
Mexico Supreme Court adopted this language from Castillo and held
that its broad view of the applicability of section 41-4-6 was correct,
because it enabled the statute to apply not merely to "premises liability"
arising
from "maintenance"
cases, but also to cases which involve liability 47
7
property.
owned
publicly
of
"operation"
or
Bober argued that one other section of the Tort Claims Act be considered as grounds for waiving the State Fair's immunity.4 78 Section 414-11 provides that waiver of immunity apply to the maintenance of or
for the existence of "any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley,
sidewalk or parking area." 479
The court agreed that this section also waived the State Fair from the
immunity that it would normally enjoy from tort claims, because "the
roadway leading from the infield parking lot to Louisiana Boulevard
or parking area' within
obviously qualifies as a 'roadway, street, alley .

the statute.'"48
Because Bober alleged negligence by the State Fair in maintaining
property owned and operated by the state of New Mexico, and because
the State Fair failed to meet its summary judgment burden, the court
reversed the lower court's grant for summary judgment on this issue.48
The court also reversed summary judgment because the State Fair failed
to meet the prima facie burdens of either of the affirmative defenses
that it asserted: 1) that the State Fair delegated its responsibilities to
Fair
Feyline and was thus immune from liability; and 2) that the State
2
should be immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act.4

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

Bober, I I I N.M. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622.
Id. at 653, 808 P.2d at 623.
107 N.M. 204, 755 P.2d 48 (1988).
Castillo v. Santa Fe County, 107 N.M. 204, 205, 755 P.2d 48, 49 (1988).
Bober, 111 N.M. at 653, 808 P.2d at 623.
Id. at 652, 808 P.2d at 622.
Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
Bober, III N.M. at 653, 808 P.2d at 623.
Id. at 651, 808 P.2d at 621.

Id.
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Off-Premises Liability-Conclusion
Calkins v. Cox Estates and Bober v. New Mexico State Fair illustrate
that the New Mexico Supreme Court has broadened its assignment of
liability to landowners to include off-the-premises settings. For now, these
decisions affect New Mexico law in that they broaden the possessor of
land's duties and potential liability for injuries occurring off as well as
on his property. 4 3 This will have a huge impact on plaintiffs' ability to
seek recourse from landowners for damages that they may incur as a
result of any number of on and off-premises occurrences.
C.

LORI McCAMEY BENCOE
JULIE VARGAS

483. As indicated, after the survey period the supreme court broadened landowners' duties in
off-premises as well as on-premises situations. Although grounded in traditional Restatement principles
of duty, the policy arguments behind these recent decisions evidence the supreme court's continually
increased willingness to apply general negligence principles to landowners. See Saiz v. Belen School
Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), discussed supra note 343, and Klopp v. Wackenhut,
113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992), discussed supra note 370. Additionally, the court of appeals'
recent application of vicarious liability to a landowner was based on a general nondelegable duty
backed by similar principles of policy. See Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677 (Ct. App.
1991), discussed supra note 343.

